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Abstract
The Internet has been a boon in the lives of many in the world, opening up
opportunities that may have been unknown or inaccessible to them. The growth in
the availability of computational resources has made it possible to collect, compile,
store, process and interpret data at a scale that was not imaginable in the past. The
combination of the Internet and computing resources has resulted in a world that
creates more data every year than ever in the past, where data can be harvested for
the benefit of society. However, when the surface seems too shiny, the dangers lurk
nearby. One such danger is privacy violation that can take several forms including
nosy corporate employees, hacked databases as well as government coercion of
centralised authorities that manage the Internet infrastructure.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic tool for privacy-
preserving computation. MPC allows multiple entities to perform joint computation
over their private inputs, revealing only the output. Although the theoretical
foundations for the two-party variant, secure two-party computation (2PC), were
introduced in the 1980s, MPC has not yet seen widespread deployment in spite of
its benefits. Not only is MPC useful when data needs to be processed, but it is also
useful when cryptographic data such as signing keys are to be kept securely.
In this thesis, we make MPC practical to secure Internet infrastructure. While
MPC has been applied to many applications, it has not yet been used to secure
Internet infrastructure. In the process of making MPC practical, we address several
challenges in this thesis. First, we observe that the practical performance of 2PC can
be improved by the use of different transport layer protocols. On the basis of this
observation, we develop a framework that automates the integration of transport
layer protocols into 2PC implementations. We show through extensive evaluations
that the efficiency gained by using better transport layer protocols is sometimes
much greater than that can be achieved by using stronger security assumptions.
iii
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Second, we observe a practical security issue where mechanisms to secure funda-
mental protocols of the Internet infrastructure, such as routing and domain name
system, rely on centralised authorities. In particular, signing keys that should be
held by domain owners and Internet number resource owners in security mechanisms
for Internet infrastructure are instead outsourced to centralised authorities. Never-
theless, vulnerabilities as well as conflict of interests often make the requirement for
trust unsuitable for practical purposes. We replace trust in centralised authorities
by designing systems that use MPC and distribute trust.
Finally, we design and implement efficient threshold signature protocols, a specific
instance of MPC, that we use to improve the security of Internet infrastructure. Our
design uses a generic transformation to turn essentially any MPC protocol into an
equally secure and efficient protocol that computes signatures in a threshold setting.
Our design is the first to support preprocessing (independent of the message being
signed as well as the key being used to sign), which is crucial for practical efficiency
as it adds minimal overhead compared to the approach of centralised authorities
being in charge of the keys.
iv
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protocols in our framework. Markus implemented the transport wrapper that we
use in the framework.
Chapter 5 includes two contributions: development of efficient threshold sig-
natures and securing domain name system security extensions (DNSSEC) keys.
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The Internet has become an indispensable tool that has enabled us to access informa-
tion, connect with people around the world and to express ourselves through various
media. The opportunities that the Internet creates has often been discussed in terms
of the applications that run on top of the Internet infrastructure. Although this
infrastructure seldom gets talked about in the mainstream discourse, it is critical to
the functioning of the applications. These applications are built on the foundation
of the Internet infrastructure. A weak and insecure foundation can be dangerous.
The Internet infrastructure was not designed with security in mind. Fundamental
protocols of the Internet such as domain name system (DNS) and routing were
designed during a time when security was not a concern. Over the years, attacks
on the Internet infrastructure have grown and this has prompted the design of
security measures such as DNS security extensions (DNSSEC) and resource public
key infrastructure (RPKI). Unfortunately, the deployment of these security measures
has been slow and they have failed to deliver on the promised security guarantees.
DNSSEC and RPKI rely on cryptographic signatures. Although the private keys
should be held by the domain owners and Internet number resource owners, in
practice, they are outsourced to centralized authorities.
Centralization of the Internet infrastructure can be harmful in numerous ways.
Certificate authorities can be taken over by rogue actors [Pri11], large DNS operators
can come under distributed denial of service attacks [DYN16] or state actors can
attempt to coerce them to behave against the best interests of citizens [ICA14].
Centralized services are attractive targets for attackers. A single point of trust can
turn into a single point of failure.
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
In this thesis, we address the concerns that arise from the outsourcing of private
material and computation to centralized authorities that run the Internet infras-
tructure. We observe that, in some cases, an intrusion may not only impinge on
the security and privacy of individuals, but may affect a group of people and their
Internet resource. When we secure a system, we consider a wide range of adversaries.
Threats range from nosy corporate employees and hacked databases to government
coercion of centralised authorities that manage Internet infrastructure. We build
systems that address these threats based on a cryptographic tool known as secure
multi-party computation (MPC) or secure computation.
1.1 Secure Multi-party Computation
Secure multi-party computation [Yao86, GMW87] allows multiple parties with private
inputs to perform a joint computation and obtain the correct output without having
to rely on a trusted third party. Let n participating parties have x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn
as their private inputs. They compute some function f to obtain the desired output
y = f(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn), such that nothing beyond the output is revealed to the
participating parties (Figure 1.1). MPC protocols have to guarantee privacy and
correctness. The privacy property enforces that only the necessary information,
and nothing else, is revealed to the participants. The correctness property assures
us that the malicious behaviour by an adversary does not cause the output of the
computation to deviate from that of the intended function.
In MPC protocols, in addition to external adversaries, participating parties are
also considered to be potential adversaries. These parties might attempt to learn
some private information or to add errors to the computation. Sometimes parties
make mistakes while in other cases they might be malicious. Sometimes they might
be in control while in other cases they may be threatened by governmental actors to
act maliciously. Encompassing such a wide range of adversaries is a feature of MPC
that also makes it possible to distribute trust when one or more entities cannot be
completely trusted.
While the foundations of computing securely using MPC were laid-down in
the 1980s, these protocols are not widely used. While some efficient application-
specific protocols have been developed [DKLS18, DKLS19], they do not advance the






Figure 1.1: Secure multiparty computation.
the security of each of these protocols. Generic protocols can contribute towards
a broader deployment of MPC. They can be used in a wide range of applications
without considerable assistance from cryptographers as their security only needs
to be proven once. This is important when we want to deploy it for the Internet
infrastructure. Hence, in this thesis, we focus on generic protocols.
In the context of MPC, we use a fine notion of trust throughout this thesis.
When we say that parties are not entirely or completely trusted, we consider them
to be trustworthy enough to provide inputs and to process them. However, they
are not trusted enough for other parties to reveal their private inputs to them. In
the case of securing private keys, while the parties are able to perform the signing
collaboratively, they are not trusted with the private key and they cannot misuse it,
lose it or leak it.
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, the focus is on generic protocols, improving their efficiency for practical
deployment and using them to secure Internet infrastructure. We ask the following
research question:
How can we improve the efficiency of generic MPC protocols that are
secure against a diverse set of adversaries such that they can be used to
secure the Internet infrastructure?
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We answer this research question through the following contributions:
1. Practical efficiency: When we consider the use of cryptographic protocols for
the Internet, efficiency is one of the primary topics of discussion. Efficiency of
MPC should be gauged based on the performance evaluations over the Internet.
Systems designed using MPC to secure Internet infrastructure need to have
low overhead such that the experience is seamless for end-users. However, until
recently, it was hard to analyse the practical efficiency of MPC protocols as
many of them have been evaluated on a single machine.
Realistic evaluations are important to understand the efficiency of the protocols
over the Internet. We observe in the case of secure two-party computation
(2PC), the two party variant of MPC, that the bandwidth is not utilized for
functions with large circuits. We observe that the use of different transport layer
protocols can improve practical performance. We develop a modular framework,
Transputation, that automates transport layer selection and integrates with
2PC implementations. We use the framework to perform extensive evaluations
in various network settings to show the benefit of using different transport
layer protocols for 2PC.
2. Efficient threshold signatures: While cryptography adds overhead to com-
putations, in some cases, most of the cryptographic operations can be pre-
processed, before the private information is available. This aspect is true
for threshold signatures, a specific instance of MPC. Threshold signatures
distribute trust such that no centralized party has control of the complete
key and they can only generate signatures in coordination with other parties.
Each of them has a “share” of a key, and a signature can be generated only
when at least a threshold number of them participate in the signing process.
This solution prevents anyone from accessing the signing keys while avoiding
reliance on individual authorities.
We design efficient threshold signature protocols based on generic MPC. We
propose a transformation that turns any MPC protocol into an equally secure
and efficient protocol that computes signatures in a threshold setting. We pro-
pose threshold signature protocols in the preprocessing setting. Our protocols




3. Securing DNSSEC keys: With DNSSEC, machines querying a DNS server
can verify that the response to a query originates from the correct server and
that the response remains unaltered in transit. While DNSSEC is beneficial
in principle, its deployment has created new problems. Domain owners typ-
ically outsource operations related to the DNS and benefit from increased
zone availability and decreased misconfiguration probability. However, with
DNSSEC, the handling of private keys is also outsourced. Access to signing
keys of domains allows DNS operators to sign bogus records at will. Possession
of signing keys of numerous domains makes DNS operators attractive targets
for attackers. There is also evidence of poor practices where DNS operators
use the same keys for multiple domains.
We address the issue of key management and of centralization of DNS operation
by developing a multi-party zone signing system that relies on threshold
signatures. Our system is designed for a wide-range of threat models. We
implement the system into a widely used DNS software and demonstrate
through evaluations that the overhead is minimal compared to traditional
DNSSEC when two or three operators are involved. We also perform a
measurement study to estimate the number of domains that can already use
our system.
4. Distributed RPKI: RPKI uses cryptographic signatures that autonomous
systems use to validate whether the source of a route is allowed to update
routes for the specific IP prefix. The centralized authorities, regional Internet
registries (RIRs), that are responsible for allocating IP address space are at
the top of the RPKI hierarchy, are completely trusted and the RPKI threat
model does not consider the possibility of RIRs being malicious or them being
coerced by nation-states. RPKI makes it possible for centralized authorities to
takedown IP prefixes.
We propose a change to RPKI that will strengthen the threat model and
prevent unilateral takedown of IP prefixes by RIRs. We replace trust in RIRs
by designing a distributed RPKI that uses MPC to distribute trust. Our
design is automated and can facilitate the deployment of RPKI while reducing
or eliminating errors due to manual configurations. We also do not require any




This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapters 2 and 3 includes the necessary
preliminaries and background information for the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2
introduces adversarial models, basics of secure computation and threshold signatures.
Chapter 3 introduces network protocols including transport layer protocols, domain
name system and routing. Chapter 4 describes the contribution of this thesis towards
practical efficiency of 2PC. Chapter 5 describes the development of efficient threshold
signatures and how we use threshold signatures to secure DNSSEC keys. Chapter 6
describes the contribution of this thesis towards the design of distributed RPKI





This chapter introduces the background information on secure computation that is
useful to understand the rest of the thesis. First, we discuss the adversarial models
in § 2.1. Then, we discuss a primitive, oblivious transfer (OT), in § 2.2 before we
describe two constructions of secure computation protocols in § 2.3. Finally, we
discuss the basics of threshold signatures in § 2.4.
2.1 Adversarial Models
In secure computation, protocols are designed based on specific assumptions about
the adversaries. First, we consider the behaviour of the adversaries. We assume the
capabilities of the adversaries when we design protocols. Second, we consider the
number of parties that can be assumed to be corrupt for the protocol to remain
secure. Based on these parameters, the efficiency of the protocols can differ.
Adversarial behaviour
With regard to the behaviour of the adversaries, we can design protocols to be secure
against adversaries with a range of capabilities. While we refer to Goldreich [Gol04,
§ 7.2] for formal definitions, we briefly describe the three most commonly used
adversarial notions.
1. Semi-honest adversaries, also known as passive adversaries or honest-but-
curious adversaries, follow the protocol but can try to extract information
from the transcript of the protocol. This adversarial model protects informa-
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tion when the parties cannot share plaintext due to legal reasons and when
protection against internal adversaries such as nosy employees is required. The
design of protocols secure against semi-honest adversaries is the stepping stone
towards protocols with stronger security guarantees and they are useful to
understand the efficiency of the protocols.
2. Malicious adversaries, also known as active adversaries, can deviate from the
protocol specifications and can try to learn private inputs and influence the
outcome of the computation. These are the strongest type of adversaries and
they are expensive to protect against as extra checks are needed to ensure that
computations are performed correctly.
3. Covert adversaries may deviate from the protocol but with the restriction
of being caught with a certain probability. The probability of being caught
should be high enough to deter attempts by adversaries to act maliciously.
In this thesis, we focus on protocols that are practical in the presence of semi-
honest and malicious adversaries.
Number of adversaries
Let us consider protocols where n parties participate. We assume that a minimum
number of parties are honest and the rest might be corrupted. The protocols where a
majority of the parties are assumed to be honest are called honest majority protocols.
The less restrictive case where it is not necessary for the majority to be honest for
the protocol to be secure is known as dishonest majority protocols. Honest majority
protocols are typically more efficient. In the special case of two-party computation,
we can only assume at most one party to be corrupt, and hence, the notion of honest
majority does not arise. In the multi-party case, we include protocols in both honest
and dishonest majority settings.
2.2 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer [Rab05] is a cryptographic primitive in which one party, a sender,
transmits multiple messages to another party, a chooser, such that the sender does
not learn which message has been received by the chooser while the chooser does not
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learn anything about the other messages. In a 1-out-of-2 OT, the sender inputs two
messages, saym0 andm1, and the chooser inputs a choice bit b ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of
the protocol, the chooser obtains mb, being ignorant of m1−b, while the sender gains
no information. Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] showed that public key cryptography
is necessary for OT and that they cannot be constructed from symmetric key
cryptography. Therefore, OT protocols must be instantiated based on public-key
type assumptions such as RSA or the Decisional-Diffie Hellman assumption. However,
in practice, the high computational cost of exponentiations required by OT protocols
can be reduced through the use OT-extension technique [Bea96, IKNP03], which
makes it possible to generate an unbounded number of OT, using only symmetric
crypto operations, from a few base OTs.
2.3 Secure Computation Constructions
Secure computation allows multiple parties to jointly compute any function of their
inputs and obtain the result without leaking any other information. The seminal
results from the 1980s [GMW87, Yao86] showed that it is possible to evaluate any
function in a secure way. That is, n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn with inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn
can jointly evaluate some function f on their inputs in such a way that these parties
learn the desired output y = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and nothing else about the input of
the other parties.
In secure computation, the function f is converted into a circuit and the protocol
is run on that circuit. The function f is expressed as a boolean or an arithmetic
circuit. A boolean circuit works on bit inputs, and is represented by a combination of
AND and XOR gates while an arithmetic circuit works on inputs that are elements
of some field F, and is represented by a combination of addition and multiplication
gates. Hence, secure computation protocols are constructed as a combination of
addition and multiplication protocols.
There are two main types of constructions that are considered in this thesis:
Yao’s garbled circuits for 2PC in § 2.3.1 and secret sharing for MPC in § 2.3.2.
2.3.1 2PC Based on Garbled Circuits
In Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [Yao86], two parties interactively compute over a
garbled version of a boolean circuit. One party, say P1, chooses two random keys
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for every wire in the circuit and then uses them to construct garbled gates. For
each wire i, two random keys are sampled k0i and k1i ; one that logically represents
the plaintext 0 bit and one that represents the plaintext 1 bit. Then, P1 uses these
keys to construct garbled gates, wherein a boolean gate g has input wires u, v and
output a wire w. P1 constructs a table of ciphertexts consisting of encryptions of the
output keys under the corresponding input keys, i.e., a garbled gate is constructed
by concatenating ciphertexts of the form
Ca,b = E(kau, kbv; kg(a,b)w )
for all four combinations of a, b ∈ {0, 1}.
P2 then obliviously evaluates the garbled gates, i.e., P2 will learn one key for
each input kau, kbv but not the values a, b. Nevertheless, P2 will be able to learn the
corresponding output key kg(a,b)w , but neither g(a, b) nor k1−g(a,b)w . The ciphertexts
in the garbled gate are permuted at random to ensure that P2 learns nothing about
the output value g(a, b). Therefore, P2 must decrypt all 4 ciphertexts and have a
mechanism to identify the right key. This is achieved by adding redundancy to the
plaintexts that in turn increases the communication complexity of the protocol.
To allow P2 to begin the evaluation, the keys corresponding to the input wires
must be sent from P1 to P2. The input wires belonging to P1 are sent directly while
those belonging to P2 are sent obliviously through OT. Then P2 evaluates the circuit,
non-interactively, gate by gate and obtains an encrypted output. Finally, if P2 is
supposed to learn the output value, P1 also sends some decoding information which
allows P2 to decode the keys corresponding to the output wires to their plaintext
values. Because of their roles in Yao’s garbled circuit protocol, P1 is also known as
the Garbler and P2 as the Evaluator.
Yao’s protocol was sub-optimal in terms of computation and communication. To
improve the efficiency of Yao’s protocol, numerous computation and communication
optimizations such as point-and-permute [BMR90], garbled row reduction [NPS99,
PSSW09], XOR-1 [GLNP15], free-XOR [KS08], fixed-key AES [BHKR13], half-gates
method [ZRE15] have been proposed. We discuss them in more detail in Chapter 4.
We have described Yao’s garbled circuit protocol that is secure in the semi-honest
security model, which is the focus of Chapter 4. The security proof of Yao’s garbled
circuits protocol can be found in Lindell and Pinkas [LP09]. We note that garbled
circuits are only secure for one-time use. Reusable garbled circuits can be designed to
be secure, but they are not yet practical [GKP+13]. It is also theoretically possible
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to garble arithmetic circuits [AIK14]. Yao’s protocol has also been modified to be
secure against malicious adversaries [LP07, LR15].
2.3.2 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is a cryptographic tool that is at the heart of many MPC protocols.
It is a tool to spread information about a secret among many parties such that
together they hold the complete information on the secret, but individually no party
has the secret. One form of secret sharing is additive secret sharing. Consider a
secret s ∈ Zp, where Zp = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} is a finite field for a prime number p.
The secret s is shared among n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn by sending x1, x2, . . . , xn such
that xi ∈ Zp and
∑
i xi = s mod p. The xis are known as the shares of the secret s
and any missing shares will prevent the reconstruction of the secret.
While we use additive sharing scheme for dishonest majority protocols in Chap-
ter 5 and 6, for honest majority protocols, we rely on Shamir’s secret sharing and
replicated secret sharing. In Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79], the secret is shared by
choosing a random polynomial and determining the shares using this polynomial.
The degree of this polynomial is at most the maximum number of corrupted parties.
Replicated secret sharing [BL88] is similar to additive secret sharing, but instead of
one share, every party receives multiple shares. Both these schemes make it possible
to recover the secret as long as a certain threshold number of shares are available.
All these secret sharing schemes—additive, Shamir’s, and replicated—are linear,
i.e., given the shares, the secret can be reconstructed through a linear combination
computed locally.
At a high-level, an MPC protocol based on secret sharing takes the following
form:
• Assuming the parties have agreed on an arithmetic circuit to compute jointly,
the parties share their secret-shared inputs with each other.
• They compute the arithmetic circuit by performing additions and multiplica-
tions over secret shared values.
• In the final step, the parties ‘open’ or reveal the result of circuit evaluation.
To compute over arithmetic circuits we have to show how the shares are added
and multiplied. Let [x] denote a secret sharing of x such that each party Pi holds
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the share [xi]. Scalar addition and multiplication can be computed locally: a+ [x]
and a · [x]. We now consider addition and multiplication of secret shared values.
Addition. To add x and y when the parties hold the shares [x], [y], we locally add
the shares:
[x+ y] = [x] + [y].
Multiplication. To multiply x and y, Beaver [Bea91] proposed the method of
circuit randomization to securely multiply random values and then use these to
multiply actual values for secure computation. Let us take one-time-usemultiplication
triples of the form (a, b, c) ∈ Zp such that c = ab. Each party holds a share of the
triple ([a], [b], [c]) and uses it for multiplication. Given the shares [x], [y] and a
multiplication triple ([a], [b], [c]), Beaver’s technique is as follows:
1. Each party locally computes and broadcasts the following values:
[e] = [a] + [x]
[d] = [b] + [y].
2. Each party opens e and d, such that e = a+ x and d = b+ y. As each party
only knows the shares of the multiplication triple that are uniformly random,
the shares of x and y are hidden by the triples.
3. The parties can then locally compute their share [z]:
[z] = [c] + e[y] + [x]d− ed.
We can show that the share [z] corresponds to the share of the product xy:
z = c+ ey + xd− ed
= c+ (a+ x)y + x(b+ y)− (a+ x)(b+ y)
= c− (a+ x)b+ x(b+ y)




Circuit randomization allows us to push a lot of the computation to the pre-
processing phase so that we can have an efficient online phase. The preprocessing
can be batched to perform many multiplications on random data. This results in
the overall protocol being more efficient. We will use this technique in Chapter 5.
Additional information on secret sharing can be found in Cramer, Damgård and
Nielsen [CDN15].
2.4 Threshold Signatures
A digital signature scheme consists of three operations—key generation, signature
creation and signature verification—that are represented by a tuple (KGen,Sig,Vf)
where:
• KGen(1λ) on input a security parameter 1λ, outputs a key pair (sk, pk) where
the signing key sk is used to create signatures and is kept secret, and the public
key pk is used for verification and made public.
• Sig(sk,M) on input the signing key sk and message M ∈ {0, 1}∗, produces a
signature σ.
• Vf(pk,M, σ) on input the public key or verification key pk, message M and
signature σ, outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on M and 0 otherwise.
A digital signature scheme satisfies two properties:
Correctness. With a high probability, all valid signatures should be verified. Given
(sk, pk)← KGen(1λ), any message M signed using the secret key sk should be
verified using the public key pk with a high probability.
Existential unforgeability. An adversary should not be able to forge a signature
σ on a messageM with greater than negligible probability if a legitimate signer
has not signed the message M before.
Threshold signatures, an idea introduced by Desmedt [Des87], allow a group to
delegate their authority to a subcommittee to sign a message. Specifically, threshold
signatures enables a group of n parties to jointly generate a single public key pk and
then compute a signature only if a certain threshold, say t+ 1 ≤ n, participate in
the signing protocol. In addition to the two properties of a digital signature scheme,
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threshold signatures must also satisfy the privacy property, that is, any group of t
or less parties will not learn anything about the signing key being used. They will
neither be able to generate a valid signature on a previously unsigned message nor
will they be able to deceive an honest party to unwillingly sign a message. Threshold
signatures can be thought of as a specific instance of MPC.
The appeal of threshold signatures is that they distribute the signing process and
they make it more robust to adversarial attacks or disruptions, while preserving the
original verification procedure of the signature scheme. In particular, signatures that
are generated by the threshold protocol can be verified as if they were computed
by a single party. The first threshold signature scheme was proposed by Desmedt
and Frankel [DF89]. This work required a trusted third party to distribute the
keys. This requirement was removed in the work of Pederson [Ped91]. Through
the 1990s and early 2000s, threshold signature protocols for DSA [GJKR96, MR01],
RSA [Sho00, DK01] and Schnorr [SS01] signatures have been proposed.
In the recent years, there has been a resurgence of threshold signatures, specifi-
cally, for ECDSA [Lin17, LNR18, GG18, DKLS18, DKLS19]. This renewed interest
can largely be attributed to their role in crypto-currency schemes where security of
the signing key is paramount as it is used to authorize transactions; in a nutshell,
the key is the account. Therefore, the possibility to increase the security of the
key by splitting the role of the signer among several separate entities, without





This chapter provides background information on network protocols that are relevant
to this thesis. First, we discuss transport layer protocols in § 3.1. Then, we discuss
domain name system security extensions in § 3.2 before we discuss border gateway
protocol and resource public key infrastructure in § 3.3.
3.1 Transport Layer Protocols
Transmission control protocol (TCP) exhibits unsatisfactory performance on inter-
continental links with high bandwidth delay product and links with high packet
loss rates. This performance degradation may not be significant if the amount
of data transferred is low. In applications with megabytes of data being trans-
ferred, this performance degradation can be critical and yet TCP is still being
used. Though approaches to improve TCP’s congestion control have been pro-
posed [HRX08, CF04, WJLH06, WJLH06, LBS08, WFGZ10, CCG+16], they fail
to perform consistently when the network assumptions on which they are based is
violated.
Most congestion control algorithms rely on indicators such as packet loss and
delay to determine the congestion in the network. TCP-CUBIC [HRX08], used
by default in Linux kernels since version 2.6.19, is a loss-based congestion control
algorithm in which the congestion window is a cubic function of time since the last
packet loss. It fills the available buffer capacity leading to large queueing delay.
Bottleneck Bandwidth and Round-trip propagation time [CCG+16], a recently
proposed congestion control algorithm, does not rely on loss or delay indicators but
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estimates the available bandwidth to determine the sending rate and tries to avoid
queueing delay. This is still a work in progress and in its current state, issues such
as increased queuing delay and massive packet losses have been observed [HBZ17].
There are alternatives to TCP such as Simple Available Bandwidth Utilization
Library(SABUL) [GG03, GG07, GG08], QUIC [QUI] and Performance-oriented
Congestion Control [DLZ+15]. SABUL and its variant UDP-based Data transfer
protocol (UDT) are UDP-based protocols with the goal of utilizing the bandwidth
efficiently. Congestion control and reliability control mechanisms of SABUL are
built on top of UDP in the application layer, making it easy for use by application
developers. It was designed for transferring large data streams over high-speed wide
area networks but has since been updated to support commodity Internet.
3.1.1 TCP-CUBIC
TCP-CUBIC uses a cubic function to manage the congestion window size. It uses a
convex component as well as a concave component for increasing the window size.
After window reduction on packet loss, the concave component contributes to the
rapid increase in the window size. As it nears the window size Wmax before the
packet loss, the growth slows down to zero. Then TCP-CUBIC begins looking for
more bandwidth and the window grows slowly away from the previous Wmax due
to the convex component. Considerable time is spent between the concave and
convex growth regions as the network stabilizes to probe for more bandwidth. The
congestion window of TCP-CUBIC is given by the following equation:
W = C(t−K)3 +Wmax
where C is a scaling factor, t is the elapsed time from the last window reduction,
Wmax is the window size before the last packet loss, and K = 3
√
Wmaxβ/C, where
β is a constant multiplication decrease factor applied for window reduction at the
time of loss event. In the rest of the thesis, we refer to TCP-CUBIC as TCP.
3.1.2 SABUL
SABUL adds reliability at the application layer on top of UDP. It makes use of
timer-based selective ACK and packet-based sequencing. Packet loss is indicated
through the use of an negative acknowledgement. It makes use of a hybrid rate-based
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congestion control and window-based flow control. Rate control, which manages
packet sending rate, is triggered at every constant interval (SY N) while window
control, which limits the number of unacknowledged packets, is triggered when an
acknowledgement packet is received. Packet sending rate is controlled through an
additive increase and multiplicative decrease algorithm. Multiplicative decrease is
by a factor of 1/9, while additive increase is independent of the round-trip time
(RTT). Additive increase factor is given by the following equation:




where x has the unit of packets/second. L is the link capacity measured by bit-
s/second. S is the SABUL packet size (in terms of IP payload) in bytes. C(x) is a
function that converts the unit of the current sending rate x from packets/second to
bits/second (C(x) = x ∗ S ∗ 8). τ = 9 is a protocol parameter.
3.2 Domain Name System
The domain name system [Moc87a, Moc87b] is one of the core-infrastructures of
Internet. DNS resolves human-readable domain names to machine-readable Internet
protocol (IP) addresses over the Internet. The basic unit of DNS organization is
the zone. A domain such as example.com is a zone, which contains records about
the hosts and child zones. The zone .com contains name server NS record for the
child zone example.com. The zone file for the domain example.com contains IPv4
address A record, IPv6 address AAAA records for the hosts, mail exchange MX records,
among others. However, DNS lacked security features, making it vulnerable to
numerous attacks such as DNS cache poisoning and DNS hijacking [Bel95, AA04,
Kam08, SS10, HS13b].
3.2.1 Domain Name System Security Extensions
DNSSEC [AAL+05a, AAL+05c, AAL+05b] secures the information in zone files by
cryptographically signing the records so that an intruder who wants to insert bogus
data will have to compromise the private key as well as the authoritative name
server, which has the responsibility of translating domain names to IP addresses for
the domains under its control. DNSSEC provides data integrity but not availability
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and confidentiality. DNSSEC defines new resource records (RRs) to store keys and
signatures which are used to authenticate DNS responses:
DNSKEY. These are public keys whose corresponding private key is used to sign
RRsets. DNSKEY is used to verify these signatures. Each zone usually creates
two DNSKEY records—one for a Key Signing Key (KSK) and another for a
Zone Signing Key (ZSK). The private key of the KSK is used to sign DNSKEY
records, and the private key of the ZSK is used to sign all other records.
RRSIG (Resource Record Signature). The RRs of the same type and name in
a DNS zone are grouped to form RRsets and the RRsets in a zone file are
hashed and signed using the private key corresponding to the DNSKEY.
DS (Delegation Signer). Contains the hash of the public key (DNSKEY) of the child
zone. It is uploaded to the parent zone by the registrar. The DS records are
signed by the parent zone. It establishes a chain of trust between the parent
and the child zone.
3.2.2 Organizations in DNS signing setup
Registries are organizations that manage top-level domains (TLDs). They are
responsible for maintaining TLD zone file.
Registrars are organizations that sell domains to the public. When a registrar sells
a domain name, it updates the registry with information such as NS record
and DS record (if DNSSEC is supported).
Domain owner is the owner of the domain name and is the customer of the
registrar.
DNS operators are organizations that run authoritative name servers. Each
domain name has at least one operator while an operator can serve as the
DNS server of many domains.
3.2.3 Zone Signing
Zone signing is an important component of DNSSEC. The resource records of the
same type are grouped to form RRsets before they are signed. These signatures and
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the DNSKEY (the public key corresponding to the secret key used to sign) are used
by security-aware DNS clients to verify the validity of DNS data. Signing is usually
performed by organizations operating the name servers for the domain. These
organizations could be DNS hosting provider, web hosting provider or a registrar.
Note that a zone file needs to be re-signed in the following situations:
1. The RRs are changed.
2. The signatures need to be refreshed.
3. The keys are changed or rolled over.
DNSSEC uses two pairs of keys: KSK and ZSK. The private key of KSK is used
to sign DNSKEY records while the private key of ZSK is used to sign the rest of the
RRsets. The reason for having two pairs of keys is that the key used to sign the
RRsets needs to be changed at regular intervals to prevent attackers from guessing
the private key. When the ZSK is changed, the registrar does not need to be involved
(if the registrar is not the DNS operator). Rolling over a KSK involves publishing a
new DNSKEY and updating the DS in the parent zone, which involves the registrar.
As KSK is recommended to be changed once an year and is kept offline while ZSK
is changed much more regularly, using two-pairs of keys reduces the overhead and
safeguards the secret keys. Note that DNSSEC does not have a key revocation
mechanism. Keys are supposed to be rolled-over periodically and if the keys are
compromised. Details of key rollover and the recommended best practices can be
found in RFC 6781 [KMG12].
The mode of zone signing may depend on the frequency of changes in the zone
and the DNS operator. Depending on the domain, the zone may be static or dynamic.
A dynamic zone can be updated if the records in the zone file changes. For example,
if the IP address for the domain changes, then the zone file needs to be updated.
A static zone, on the other hand, is a complete set of records that is created and
signed offline. Whenever records in the zone are updated, the corresponding RRsets
need to be signed.
DNSSEC signing can take two forms: offline signing and “on-the-fly” signing.
While offline signing is sufficient for static zones, many operators use “on-the-fly”
signing, where the RRsets are signed after a DNS query is received. The signature is
generated “on-the-fly” and sent with the DNS response. The efficiency of the signing
system becomes more important in the case of “on-the-fly” signing.
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3.2.4 Registrar as DNS Operator
Some of the registrars offer their customers the option where (1) the domain owner
can operate the domain, or (2) the registrar becomes the DNS operator and serves
as the authoritative name server for the domain being purchased. With regard to
DNSSEC, the registrar plays a critical role irrespective of the option chosen by
the domain owner. The registrar registers its customer’s domain name with the
registry, updates the NS record as well as DS record. Typically, only the registrar
is allowed to modify information about the domain names it has registered at the
registry. As only the registrar can upload a DS record for the domain to the registry
and a missing DS breaks the chain of trust, the registrar plays a critical role in the
DNSSEC ecosystem. In Chapter 5, we also consider the scenario where the registrar
is the DNS operator. In this setting, the registrar can directly upload the DS record
when it is available. However, we are concerned about the registrar (as the domain
operator) having complete control over the domain, especially the private keys.
3.2.5 Multi-Operator Setting
The evolution of DNS over the past two decades has seen the move from the
recommendation to swap secondary zones with other organizations [EBBP97] to
the reliance on DNS operators with global points of presence. Nevertheless, many
domains were not accessible in the face of large-scale distributed denial of service
attacks, e.g., on NS1 [Bee16] and Dyn [DYN16] in 2016, because of their reliance
on a single DNS operator. One solution to safeguard against such attacks on the
infrastructure of a single operator is to use multiple DNS operators to host zone files.
If the zone is signed by one signing server and only served by the other operators as a
secondary authoritative name server, then standard zone transfer techniques suffice.
However, some operators only support online signing while others offer non-standard
DNS features. DNSSEC in this setting is challenging [HAD+20].
3.3 Routing
Internet infrastructure relies on the border gateway protocol (BGP) to perform
inter-domain routing between autonomous systems (ASes). An AS is identified by a
unique number, known as AS number (ASN), that is assigned to the AS along with
IP prefixes by one of the five RIRs. ASes announce the path to a destination IP
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prefix to establish routing tables. This announcement, known as BGP announcement,
includes the destination IP prefix (e.g., 192.0.2.0/24) and the ASNs on the path.
When other routers receive such announcements, they update their routing tables.
Usually, they choose the most specific prefix when making routing decisions.
As the original BGP did not have security features, it is vulnerable to attacks.
A malicious AS could announce a route for a prefix that it does not own, which may
not only result in traffic interruption but can also be used to intercept traffic. Such
an attack is known as prefix hijacking. A malicious AS may also announce a more
specific prefix (say, 203.0.113.192/26) than the originator’s prefix (203.0.113.0/24).
As routers usually choose the more specific prefix to route traffic, the packets will
be forwarded to the malicious AS. Such an attack is known as sub-prefix attack.
3.3.1 Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Resource public key infrastructure is an out-of-band mechanism that uses crypto-
graphic signatures to prevent prefix and sub-prefix attacks. The signatures are used to
specify the entities that are authorized to announce specific prefixes. RPKI architec-
ture includes trust anchors, certificate authority (CA) certificates and end-entity (EE)
certificates. A trust anchor is a self-signed X.509 CA certificate [LKS04, CSF+08]
that is at the head of the chain and is assumed to be trusted. Each RIR has a trust
anchor. In X.509 architecture, the chain of trust is derived from this authoritative
certificate. The trust anchor contains a public key in the subjectPublicKeyInfo
field along with the associated data that are used when a signature on a certificate
or a signed object is validated [RW10, HWM+19]. A trust anchor is used to sign
the CA certificates of each member.
A resource holder needs a CA certificate to sub-allocate resources and to issue
resource certificates. A CA certificate binds Internet Number Resources (INRs)
and IP prefixes to a public key. CA certificate is used to sign EE certificate, which
verifies signed objects. The private key corresponding to the public key in an EE
certificate cannot be used to sign other certificates. There is a one-to-one mapping
between EE certificate and signed objects. If the EE certificate is revoked, then the
corresponding signed objects are automatically revoked.
Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects, X.509 certifi-
cates, that provide a method to verify that an IP address block holder has authorized
an AS to originate routes to specific prefixes within that address block (Figure 3.1).
21
Chapter 3. Network Protocols
Prefix 203.0.113.0/24
MaxLength /24
Origin AS AS 12345
Figure 3.1: Route origin authorization.
While each ROA includes exactly one ASN, multiple ASNs may be authorized, with
each ASN requiring a separate ROA. Each ROA, though, can contain multiple IP
prefixes with their prefix lengths.
A Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is a list of resource certificates that have
been revoked, and should not be relied upon by the relying parties. A CRL is always
issued by the same CA that issues the corresponding certificates. All these objects
are published in public repositories.
3.3.2 Hosted and Delegated RPKI
There are two RPKI models: delegated RPKI and hosted RPKI. In the delegated
RPKI model, AS runs a CA as a child of RIR, generates its own certificate, gets it
signed by the parent CA. This model allows the AS to operate independently from
the parent RIR. For large operators of a global network, this model is suitable so
that they do not need to maintain ROAs through the different web interfaces of the
RIRs. However, this model is not suitable for all as it requires running a CA and
maintaining the ROAs.
In the hosted-RPKI model, RIRs host the CA, i.e., the same entity that allocates
IP resources also runs the CA to validate the ROAs. Thus, in this model, they are
trust anchors. In a way, this is meaningful as the RIRs already know the owner of the
address space. Existing RPKI systems are tied-up with the login credentials of the
ASes at the RIR. Signing and key rollover are automatic. It is easy for the owners
of the address space to begin using hosted RPKI than delegated RPKI as the CA
functionality is handled by the RIR. This model is convenient for most ASes. Even
large providers such as Cloudflare make use of hosted RPKI 1. Furthermore, the
RIR assumes responsibility to publish the signed objects. However, this convenience
comes at the cost of further centralization of power as the RIRs also handle the




3.3.3 Route Origin Validation
RPKI has two sides: (1) creating certificates and RPKI objects (2) validating the
ROAs of others. So far we have discussed the former. When it comes to validating,
the ASes use relying party software to download and validate RPKI objects from
one of the public repositories. In the rest of the thesis, We refer to ASes in this
capacity as relying parties. When a relying party receives a BGP announcement, it
attempts to validate the announcement and assigns one of the following states to
the announcement:
• Valid: The announcement is covered by at least one ROA such that
1. the origin ASN in the announcement matches the ASN in a ROA,
2. the IP prefix in the announcement is covered by a ROA, and
3. the IP prefix in the announcement is not greater than the MaxLength in
the AS.
• Invalid: The announced IP prefix is covered by a ROA but the ASN in the
announcement does not match the ROA.




Optimal Transport Layer for
Secure Computation
Secure two-party computation allows any two parties to perform a computation over
their private inputs and obtain the correct output of the computation without leaking
any other information. 2PC ensures the privacy of the inputs of the participants
and of the computation. 2PC eliminates the need for a trusted third party when
two non-trusting parties want to obtain an output by computing a function. From a
practical point of view, the underlying premise is that, if the two parties cannot trust
each other, how probable is it that they will be able to find a mutually trustworthy
party to facilitate a computation?
Secure two-party computation has the potential to facilitate numerous applica-
tions while maintaining user privacy. 2PC is a powerful tool that enables collabo-
rations that were previously infeasible. Presently, possession of sensitive personal
data prevents governments, companies and individuals from engaging in online
transactions with each other due to reasons such as lack of trust between them,
concern for the privacy of their customers as well as privacy regulations such as the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Examples of such applications include
key management for digital currencies [ABL+18], auctions [BCD+09], tax-fraud de-
tection [BJSV15], private set intersection [CMP11, HEK12, PSZ18], and prevention
of satellite collision [KW15, HLOI16].
Nevertheless, 2PC is typically not used in real life applications due to performance
issues and it has not yet received widespread acceptance from the industry. The
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current compromise is that many transactions (aforementioned and others) either
require sacrificing the privacy of users (e.g., via a third party) or cannot be performed
online.
Computation is optimal
While the theoretical efficiency of 2PC protocols can be understood in terms of the
computation and communication complexity, they are not sufficient to understand
the practical efficiency of 2PC protocols. The first public implementation of 2PC
known as Fairplay was released in 2004 [MNPS04]. This implementation has been
the starting point for the huge progress made in terms of 2PC protocol design and
implementation engineering. The most efficient implementations of 2PC protocols
are based on the protocol proposed by Yao [Yao86] which is built from garbled
circuits [BHR12] and oblivious transfer [NP01]. Over the years, due to protocol
optimisations, hardware support for cryptographic operations and the use of multiple
cores, the computation overhead of 2PC protocols has been reduced drastically and
there are indications that the current constructions of 2PC based on garbled circuits
have reached the theoretical lower bound [ZRE15]. It is now widely believed that the
bandwidth, and not the computation, is the remaining bottleneck in 2PC [ALSZ13,
ZRE15].
Implementations are still not practical
Since Fairplay, there have been numerous prototype implementations of 2PC proto-
cols [HEKM11, EFLL12, DSZ15, ZE15, WMK16]. Although the number of imple-
mentations has increased, it is important to note that most of these implementations
have been developed to demonstrate feasibility [Hal18]. Some of the implementations
are evaluated in simulated environments or on a single host that neither take into
account realistic network conditions nor the presence of other processes [Kre17].
Current 2PC as well as MPC implementations are difficult to use for develop-
ers [HHNZ19]. The result is that users have to trade-off their privacy with efficiency
by resorting to third parties to perform computations for them instead of running
2PC with the target service.
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Communication is yet to be explored
Although there has been work on reducing the communication complexity and
limiting the amount of data that needs to be exchanged between the two parties, there
has not been any research on the practical communication efficiency of 2PC. Indeed,
evaluations of 2PC implementations on a single machine now result in practical
performance [BHKR13, SZ13]. Nevertheless, when 2PC is evaluated on separate
hosts, the latency overhead is prohibitive for practical applications [NST17, WRK17].
Evaluations of 2PC disregard issues faced by practical deployment of 2PC: many
implementations are not evaluated in real life setups where diverse network conditions,
such as packet loss, latency, and other traffic can impact performance [Kre17, Hal18].
Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
Yao vs. GMW. We show evidence through evaluations that 2PC protocol based
on Yao’s garbled circuits is more efficient than GMW in all network settings.
The prior understanding was that GMW was more efficient in LAN setting. Our
evaluations show that this is not the case any more because of the optimizations
to garbled circuits. Based on this evidence, we focus on Yao’s protocol in the
rest of this chapter.
Network utilisation of secure computation protocols. We study the network
utilisation of secure computation implementations. Our evaluations indicate
that the bandwidth of secure computation implementations is under-utilised.
As in Fairplay [MNPS04], all the implementations use standard TCP for com-
munication irrespective of the network setting in which the scheme is to be
deployed [HEKM11, EFLL12, DSZ15, ZE15, WMK16]. This is surprising as
there has been considerable research towards choosing the right 2PC scheme
for a given setting. In contrast to improvements in computation and communi-
cation complexity, the transport layer has so far received no attention from
the 2PC research community.
Transputation framework. We bridge the gap between research in 2PC proto-
cols and transport layer protocols by developing Transputation framework.
Transputation provides an interface for easy and automated integration of
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transport layer protocols for secure computation. It is a modular frame-
work that optimizes the practical performance of 2PC protocols by choosing
the transport layer protocol based on the parameters of the 2PC protocol
and the network conditions. We have integrated three transport layer pro-
tocols into Transputation: UDP, TCP and SABUL 1. Given a function to
be computed securely and the circuit size, Transputation estimates the net-
work conditions to automatically choose the optimal transport layer pro-
tocol in the framework. The modularity of the framework makes it easy
to add new transport protocols as well as 2PC implementations indepen-
dently. The source code implementation of Transputation can be accessed
at https://github.com/Fraunhofer-SIT/transputation.
Evaluations of 2PC. We use Transputation to perform extensive evaluations.
First, we simulate different network conditions to understand the performance
of 2PC protocols with different transport layer protocols before we consider
the complexity of the Internet and evaluate the performance in large-scale real
world networks. Through our evaluations using Transputation, we demonstrate
that even general purpose protocols already provide significant performance
improvement over standard TCP in certain network conditions. For instance,
for large circuit sizes in WAN setting, SABUL performs 7− 8× better than
TCP (Figure 4.1). We note that although special purpose transport protocols
could improve the performance further, we focus on general purpose protocols
to foster widespread deployment.
Chapter Outline
Section 4.1 introduces Transputation framework and its layers. The optimizations and
implementations in secure computation layer and the transport layer are explained in
Section 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Section 4.4 presents the design and implementation
of Transputation framework. Section 4.5 reports the simulation and evaluation
results of Transputation. Section 4.6 reviews related work.
1Though we use the most updated version of SABUL, also commonly known as UDT or





















Figure 4.1: TCP vs. SABUL as garbled circuit size increases.
4.1 Transputation Framework
In this section, we provide an overview of Transputation and explain how it can be
used. We describe in § 4.1.1 the components of Transputation before we describe in
§ 4.1.2 how Transputation can be used.
4.1.1 Components
The goal of Transputation is to identify the transport layer protocol that is optimal
for a given function to be computed securely in real network settings. To pursue this
goal, our framework has two layers: the secure computation layer and the transport
layer (see Figure 4.2).
Secure Computation Layer. This layer is composed of 2PC implementations
that accept the function or application to be evaluated securely and the size
of the circuit representing the function. In § 4.2, we motivate our choices for
2PC implementations that we integrate into Transputation. We identify the
parameters that impact the data volume and communication pattern, and
deploy optimizations relevant for performance improvements on the transport
layer.
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Secure Computation Transport Layer






Figure 4.2: Transputation framework.
Transport Layer. This layer is responsible to identify an optimal transport layer
protocol for a given computation task. To that end, it determines the latency,
bandwidth and packet loss on the network through live experimental probes.
Transport layer is also responsible for avoiding overflow at the sender and the
receiver. To avoid overflow, given the function to be computed and the size
of inputs to the circuit, Transputation calculates the required buffer sizes on
the sender and the receiver. We explain the transport layer implementation in
§ 4.3.
We integrate, in both layers, representative protocols to demonstrate the usage
of framework as well as the evaluation of 2PC implementations. Transputation
brings together the secure computation layer and the transport layer by choosing
a suitable transport protocol based on the combination of parameters obtained
from them. Transputation is built to support easy extensions at both layers. New
implementations of 2PC as well as new transport layer protocols can be integrated
into Transputation. The flexibility for easy integration of transport layer protocols
is critical—new protocols are continually devised, e.g., to improve performance of
applications in diverse network conditions or to support new Internet architectures.
Future protocols may improve the performance of 2PC more than the existing
options. Transputation provides agility and flexibility for 2PC developers enabling
them to constantly extend the implementations with new transport protocols.
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4.1.2 Usage of Transputation
We have implemented abstract classes into Transputation that simplifies and au-
tomates the selection of transport layer protocols. Adding a new transport layer
protocol to the framework only requires specifying a string to identify the protocol
without requiring any changes to the 2PC implementation. Without the frame-
work, substantial parts of the 2PC implementation will need to be re-written to
accommodate new transport layer protocols. In many existing secure computation
implementations, the code is not modular. The network code is interwoven with the
application code. The transport layer protocol as well as the IP address and the
port numbers are hard-coded into the application code. This problem has also been
independently observed by Halevi [Hal18]. Unwrapping such an implementation and
adding transport layer protocols requires extensive rewriting of the code base. To
begin with, an entangled code base prevents retrofitting of transport layer protocols.
The code base will need to be made modular before considering the integration of
different transport protocols.
Secure computation developers can use Transputation in three ways:
1. Developers can use the transport layer module to automatically choose the
most appropriate transport protocol in a given network setting for their
2PC implementation and application. Developers can implement the 2PC
protocol without worrying about the underlying transport layer protocol. Then,
the developers can invoke the transport layer part of Transputation that is
implemented as a wrapper. Our implementation provides functions to set
up a connection between the two parties, to send and to receive data. The
2PC implementation is then integrated with the transport layer protocol that
provides the most efficient run time.
2. Developers can also test the 2PC protocol manually by experimenting with
the various transport layer protocols available in Transputation under various
network conditions for a particular 2PC protocol implementation. This allows
developers to choose the most suitable transport layer protocol for the 2PC
application.
3. Secure computation protocols consist of interactive primitives such as OT and
OT extensions. Transputation can be used not only by developers who use
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these primitives to construct a 2PC protocols, but also by the designers of the
primitives to test the practical efficiency of their design.
4.2 Secure Computation Layer
In this section, we present the secure computation layer of Transputation. We
compare the performance of 2PC based on garbled circuits with GMW in § 4.2.1
and show that the former is more efficient in all settings. Then, we explain our
choice of 2PC protocols based on garbled circuits in § 4.2.2 and the applications
in § 4.2.3. We describe the parameters that define the amount of data to be
transmitted, the properties that impact the communication performance and we list
recent optimisations relevant for our improvements on the transport layer, which
we integrate into Transputation. As described in § 2.1, there are three adversarial
notions that are most commonly used in secure computation: semi-honest, malicious
and covert adversaries. This chapter focusses on 2PC secure against semi-honest
adversaries.
4.2.1 Yao vs. GMW
Currently the most efficient technique for secure two-party computation is based on
Yao’s protocol with garbled circuits (see preliminaries in § 2.2 and § 2.3). The main
features of Yao’s protocol are: it has constant rounds, and it is computationally cheap
since it mostly uses lightweight symmetric-key operations and very few expensive
public-key operations such as exponentiations. Moreover, due to the nowadays
ubiquitous presence of the Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (AES-
NI) in modern CPUs, the computational overhead of generating and evaluating
garbling circuits has further decreased.
The main alternative to Yao’s protocol is the GMW protocol [GMW87] (which is
purely based on OT). The most efficient GMW protocol known is the one presented
by Schneider and Zohner [SZ13] and then refined by Demmler, Schneider and
Zohner [DSZ15]. The OTs are precomputed [Bea95] and the base OTs are extended
based on the OT extension protocol. The implementation of this work, available
as part of ABY library [DSZ15], includes the use of multiplication triples [Bea91],
which is generated by an 1-out-of-2 OT in an offline phase [Gil99], to evaluate AND
gates.
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Table 4.1: Yao vs. GMW in LAN and intercontinental settings (runtime in ms).
Unlike Yao’s protocol, the GMW protocol has non-constant round complexity
(proportional to the depth of the circuit to be evaluated). This requirement hinders its
efficiency, especially in high latency setting. Schneider and Zohner [SZ13] concluded
that GMW protocol with multiple rounds was more efficient than Yao’s garbled
circuits in low latency LAN settings. However, the evaluations were compared to
that of Huang et al. [HEKM11] from 2011. Since then, the garbled circuits protocol
has been further optimized. In Table 4.1, we show evidence that Yao’s protocol is
currently more efficient than GMW in all network settings. Thus, we do not consider
GMW any further in this chapter.
4.2.2 Garbling Schemes
Once we have fixed our attention on Yao’s protocol, we can consider several optimized
garbling schemes that have been proposed. In particular, the original garbling scheme
by Yao was sub-optimal both from a communication point of view (as it produced
large garbled tables for all gates) and from a computational point of view (as the
evaluator had to decrypt multiple ciphertexts for each gate in the circuit). Since
then, many novel and optimized garbling schemes have been proposed.
We focus on the recently optimized garbling schemes. The three main character-
istics of such garbling schemes are: the size of the produced garbled circuits (which
impacts the communication efficiency of the protocol), the number of encryptions and
decryptions that have to be performed for generating and evaluating a garbled gate
(which impacts the computational overhead of the protocol), and the computational
assumptions under which the garbling scheme is proven secure.
We have included the three most representative garbling schemes with respect
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Protocols Optimizations
[GLNP15] Pipelining + Key Scheduling; 4-2 GRR + XOR-1
Pipelining + Key Scheduling; Free-XOR; Half-gates
[ZRE15] Fixed key AES; Free-XOR; Half-gates
Table 4.2: List of implementations.
to efficiency and security. All other schemes in the literature are strictly worse when
it comes to either efficiency or security. Both security and efficiency are crucial
properties for a garbling scheme. In our evaluations with Transputation, we extend
upon the work of Gueron et al. [GLNP15] to show that with a better selection of
transport layer protocols, secure computation with standard assumptions can be
made more efficient.
These three implementations exhibit different network characteristics (e.g., the
crypto-material that needs to be exchanged). Concretely, we have implemented 2PC
protocols based on the following three garbling schemes in Transputation (Table 4.2):
1. The most efficient known garbling scheme that makes conservative and standard
assumptions (namely, that AES is a pseudo-random function (PRF)), proposed
by Gueron et al. [GLNP15], henceforth GLNP15;
2. A more communication efficient garbling scheme that supports free-XOR [KS08]
and half-gates [ZRE15] (at the price of having to assume circular security
properties of AES);
3. A further improvement in the computational overhead at the price of having to
assume that AES with a fixed-key behaves like an ideal permutation [BHKR13].
We have chosen implementations that range from using minimal and standard
cryptographic assumptions to strong and non-standard cryptographic assumptions.
Not only do these implementations provide varying degrees of security, but they
also differ in terms of the computation performed and the data communicated. The
communication depends on the garbled circuit size, which is conditioned on the
cryptographic assumption used to generate the garbled circuit. We use the garbled
circuits implementations that are part of the Libscapi library [EFLL12], since all
the known garbled circuit optimizations have been incorporated into it.
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GLNP15. The first implementation we consider is GLNP15. The main advantage
of this garbling scheme is that it only makes conservative computational assumptions,
i.e., it can be proven secure under the assumption that AES behaves like a PRF.
Similar to all garbling schemes that we consider in Transputation, the garbling of
linear gates (e.g., XOR) and non-linear gates (e.g., AND) is performed differently.
In GLNP15, garbling an AND gate produces two ciphertexts (using the 4-2 Garbled
Row Reduction technique, or GRR for short), while garbling an XOR gate produces
one ciphertext using the XOR-1 technique. From a computational point of view,
garbling with AES key scheduling (expansion of the key into separate round keys)
is pipelined. Circuit garbling requires four key schedules per gate while circuit
evaluation requires two key schedules.
Half-Gate. The second implementation is based on the work of Zahur, Rosulek
and Evans [ZRE15], and uses the so called “half-gate” optimization, which in turn is
compatible with the “free-XOR” optimization of Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08].
This optimization requires a stronger computational assumption on AES that assumes
some form of circular-security (a kind of related-key assumption). To understand the
need for this assumption, we briefly recall the free-XOR optimization. In free-XOR,
for each wire i, the keys (k0i , k1i ) are set to (ki, ki ⊕R) where R is a global “offset”.
To garble a XOR gate with input wires i, j and output wire `, the output key k`
is set to ki ⊕ kj . To evaluate the XOR gate it is not sufficient to compute kai ⊕ kbj
which is equal to ka⊕b` because of how the keys were set-up. When garbling AND
gates, one has to encrypt the output keys under the corresponding input keys. Lets
assume, without loss of generality, that the evaluator has input keys k0i , k0j for this
gate and therefore learns k0` . Now the evaluator should not be able to decrypt the
value k1` which is encrypted under keys k1i , k1j , e.g.,
E(k1i , k1j ; k1` ) = E(k0i ⊕R, k0j ⊕R; k0` ⊕R) .
Since all the 0-keys are known, the only unknown left is the global offset R which
is, essentially, encrypted under R itself; thus, explaining the need for the circular
security assumption. The half-gate optimization reduces the number of ciphertexts
necessary to garble an AND gate from four to two, using a different approach than
GLNP15. We refer to the original paper [ZRE15] for details.
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JustGarble. The final implementation we consider was proposed in the JustGarble
framework [BHKR13]. Recall that key-scheduling is the most expensive phase when
using the AES-NI, i.e., the instruction is optimized to garble large amount of data
under the same key, but loses some of its efficiency when different keys have to
be used every time. In garbling schemes, each gate consists of ciphertexts where
different keys are used; thus, the full power of the AES-NI set is not exploited. In
JustGarble, AES is used as an ideal permutation “in stream cipher mode” by setting
the key as a fixed constant. To encrypt a message m under a key k, we compute
C = AESc(k)⊕m for some constant c. For this construction to be secure, we need
to assume that AES with a fixed-key behaves like a random permutation (this in
turn implies circular security as needed for free-XOR and half-gates). Fixed-key
AES requires one key schedule to be computed for the entire circuit and eliminates
the need for multiple AES key scheduling, which is relatively more expensive than
encryption and decryption. This usage of AES is non-standard and, amongst the
three schemes presented, it provides the most extreme efficiency/security trade-off.
4.2.3 Applications and Circuit Size
Once we have fixed the protocol and the garbling scheme, we are left with one
dimension, namely, which function should we evaluate using the 2PC protocol. For
garbled circuit protocols, the circuit size plays a significant role in defining the
amount of data to be transferred over the network. The amount of data transferred
from the Garbler to the Evaluator is a linear function of the circuit size. In particular,
there is a difference in the price to pay (in terms of communication complexity)
for linear gates vs. non-linear gates, and different garbling schemes have different
coefficients for these two types of gates.
In this chapter, we consider applications with circuits of three different sizes.
These circuits are becoming the de-facto standards for benchmarking of secure
computation protocols, mostly since they represent three different orders of mag-
nitude in circuit sizes. In particular, we benchmark Transputation on the circuits
for AES (≈ 105 gates), SHA256 (≈ 106 gates) and MinCut (≈ 107 gates), which are
considered as applications of small, medium and large circuits respectively. AES has
been used as a benchmark for secure computation protocols [GLNP15] and MinCut
is a large circuit that allows us to show that the performance of the protocols in








Table 4.3: Number of boolean gates per function.
Function
AES SHA256 MinCut
GLNP15 0.59 3.41 69.04
Half-Gate 0.21 2.77 30.52
JustGarble 0.21 2.77 30.52
Table 4.4: Circuit size per function in megabytes for each garbling scheme.
circuit as it is the largest circuit available in libscapi. We use SHA256 circuit as an
intermediate-size circuit. The exact number of gates and the distribution between
AND and XOR gates for these circuits is shown in Table 4.3.
For a particular circuit, the circuit size depends on the security assumptions.
Depending on the security assumptions, the amount of data for a particular circuit
varies. When garbling using GLNP15, each AND gate produces two ciphertexts
while each XOR gate produces one ciphertext. For AES, SHA256 and MinCut, the
amount of data communicated is 0.59MB, 3.41MB, 69.04MB respectively. When
garbling using the Half-Gate construction or JustGarble, no ciphertexts are needed
for XOR gates while two ciphertexts are produced per AND gate. For AES, SHA256
and MinCut, the amount of data communicated is 0.21MB, 2.77MB and 30.52MB.
It can be observed that, for MinCut circuit with many XOR gates, the number of
ciphertexts sent over the network has a high dependency on the garbling scheme
used. In Table 4.4, a summary of the circuit sizes in megabytes is provided.
4.3 Transport Layer
In this section, we describe in § 4.3.1 the network characteristics that Transputation
measures to optimise performance, parameters for selection of optimal transport
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layer protocol, and the challenges of integrating transport layer protocols. Then, we
describe in § 4.3.2 the transport layer protocols that we integrate into Transputation.
4.3.1 Transport Protocol Selection
Given the circuit size and the 2PC implementation, the transport layer of Transpu-
tation measures the packet loss and the latency to heuristically determine which
transport protocol is optimal. The decision whether reliability and congestion control
mechanisms are needed is made considering the network characteristics. Transputa-
tion runs continuous experiments with PING, probes the network for losses, tries
different sending rates and selects a protocol that empirically produces optimal
performance.
Protocol selection based on latency. Latency plays an important role in the
choice of transport layer protocol. When the time to transmit one TCP window is
longer than the RTT, the transmission proceeds in full pipe, and is essentially similar
to UDP since the congestion window does not limit the transmission. To determine if
transmission proceeds in full pipe, Transputation performs the following computation:
let W be the bytes in the TCP window and let ttrans be the transmission delay of
one byte. Let RTT be the time it takes to transmit one TCP segment and receive
an ACK. If W · ttrans > RTT , then there is no impact of TCP congestion window
on the latency since transmission proceeds in pipeline. Transputation measures the
RTT, the window size W and the ratio of W · ttrans to RTT and determines which
transport protocol to use (i.e., window-based or to transmit in full pipe).
Protocol selection based on communication rounds. The relevant parame-
ters here are the number of rounds and data volume. Window based protocols, such
as TCP, are not optimal for 2PC implementations with small number of rounds and
large data volumes due to the fact that the transmission window of TCP increases
with the number round trips. In TCP the window starts with one segment and
increases exponentially with every received ACK. As a result, although only a few
interactions are required on the application layer, they will be performed in multiple




Avoiding Packet Loss. Transputation avoids packet loss at the sender by adjust-
ing the size of buffers as a function of latency, transmission rate and the data volume
to be transmitted. The application sends packets to the transport layer, which
depletes the buffer by passing the packets on to the IP layer to subsequently transmit
the packets on the wire. When the application passes the packets faster than the
transport and the IP layers can process them, then the buffers will overflow and
packets will be lost. Transputation adjusts the buffers, according to the computation
below, to avoid packet loss. Given the differences between the transmission rate
and the rate at which the data is passed on to the IP buffer (respectively transport
layer) at the sender, the transmission rate and the rate at which the IP buffers (and
respectively transport layer) are depleted at the receiver, and the input sizes and the
secure computation implementation (which define the data volume and the rate at
which it will be exchanged), Transputation performs a computation of the maximum
amount of data that can be sent in one window.
The computation that is performed by Transputation is as follows: Given a
receiver buffer of size B, with data arrival rate Rarrival, and the buffer depletion rate
Rread. Transputation computes the maximum window size as geometric series that
converges to: L = B1−Rarrival/Rread . During the computation, the data transmitted
will be limited by L bytes during each transmission window. This accounts for
the data that is being read, while new data arrives, and allows to optimise the
communication. This is not the same as the flow control performed by TCP, which
avoids overflow at the receiver.
4.3.2 Transport Protocols in Transputation
We integrate the following transport protocols into Transputation: TCP, UDP and
SABUL. We implement TCP for comparison to other transport protocols. We use
UDP as a benchmark for connection-less protocols on networks without losses. We
integrate SABUL as it is currently used by an increasing number of applications, and
provides reasonable performance for Internet communication. Furthermore, SABUL
is TCP-friendly and fair to other applications sharing the same network. New and
even more efficient protocols may be developed in the future. Transputation enables
easy integration of new and additional transport protocols. We describe the steps
needed for integrating new protocols into Transputation in § 4.4.
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4.4 Transputation Implementation
The design goal of Transputation is to provide a modular design that can be
extended with other secure computation protocols as well as transport layer protocols.
Transputation allows secure computation researchers to focus on the protocol details
without worrying about the networking aspects of the implementation. Modularity is
not restricted to secure computation protocols. Transport layer protocols, ancillary
to those included in the framework, can be added to the framework if required.
Abstraction. The transport layer part of Transputation is implemented as a
wrapper written in C++ that can be easily plugged in with secure computation
protocols. The current version uses synchronous sockets that is sufficient for our
purposes. It abstracts the network functionality and removes the requirement to
deal with the transport layer protocols themselves. The transport layer protocol can
be set at runtime, making it easier to compare different protocols without the need
for recompilation. Since most of the secure computation implementations developed
in the past few years are written in C++, polymorphism in C++ is used to achieve
modularity. We implement an abstract class with methods required to establish and
close connections, and to send and receive data. Every transport layer protocol that
is or will be implemented in our wrapper extends this class and implements these
methods. This provides secure computation developers with two benefits: First, they
do not need to know how to use the transport layer protocol and second, they can
use new protocols that are added to the wrapper without making any change to the
executable or library of the secure computation implementation. To implement a
new protocol only the four methods of the abstract class are required: SetupClient,
SetupServer, RecvRaw, SendRaw.
The wrapper currently supports UDP, TCP and SABUL. Since UDP does not
provide reliability, it cannot be used in real-world scenarios with packet losses or
where the correct order of packets cannot be guaranteed. If a dedicated network
without packet loss is available, then UDP can be used. In all other cases, we
recommend to use TCP or SABUL in Transputation. To choose between TCP and
SABUL, we provide evaluations in § 4.5.
Simplification. We have used predefined class methods to simplify common
tasks. When an instance of the Transport class is created, a socket is already
allocated and set up on creation (by using socket() for TCP or UDP). Then the
user decides if a client that connects to a server should be created, or if a server
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1 auto ∗ t = GetTransport ( " tcp " ) ;
2 t−>SetupServer ( " 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 " , 1234 ) ;
Figure 4.3: Setting up a server with our wrapper.
that listens on a port and waits for incoming connections should be created. For
example, using our wrapper, a TCP server can be setup as shown in Figure 4.3.
This reduces the number of lines needed as well as improves the readability and
encourages users to separate program logic from network code. This is important to
make the code reusable. It is also easier to test the functionality of different parts
when they are separated in a modular design. The wrapper also includes two static
methods, GetLatencyClient() and GetLatencyServer() to measure the latency.
These methods use UDP packets to measure the RTT in milliseconds. This can be
used to decide which protocol should be used. Finally, the wrapper takes care of
byte order, which makes it simple to port applications to different platforms.
Packet handling. Transport layer protocols have contrasting methods to send
data. For instance, UDP sends single packets, and hence, sending ten 100 byte
packets is not an issue. However, sending packets larger than the maximum allowed
packet size, limited by the underlying maximum transmission unit of the network
stack, is not possible without splitting the data into smaller chunks. This has to be
done by the program that incorporates UDP, which does not provide this by itself.
In contrast to UDP, TCP sends data as a stream. If the data to be sent is too large,
it will be split into multiple packets by the protocol. To simplify usage of different
transport layer protocols, the wrapper allows users to send and receive packets in
arbitrary sizes.
To solve the issue where multiple packets are received as a big chunk, the wrapper
includes a Packet class that can be used to send a given amount of data. The
receiver can, without knowing the packet size prior to receiving, receive the packet.
For all protocols, which can be included in the wrapper, the data will be split into
multiple packets if needed and reassembled at the receiver. When 10 packets are
sent with the wrapper it will receive 10 packets. In order to tell the packets apart,
the length information is added to the data so it can be interpreted by the receiving
side. This length information is converted to network byte order to make it cross
compatible among systems with a different endianness. So sending data from a
big-endian machine to a little-endian machine (or vice versa) will work since the
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1 auto ∗ t = GetTransport ( " tcp " ) ;
2 t−>SetupCl ient ( " 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 " , 1234 ) ;
3 t−>Connect ( ) ;
4 auto p = t−>Recv ( ) ;
5 t−>Send (p ) ;
Figure 4.4: Example of an echo client using our wrapper.
bytes of the 16 bit length value are not accidentally flipped due to different byte
order.
Integration. The wrapper can be integrated into any secure computation
protocol by simply calling methods of the wrapper such as Send() or Recv() in the
Transport instance. The protocols can be supplied as a string such as udp and tcp.
If the wrapper is extended with a new transport layer protocol, then the framework
will be able to use this protocol without any changes. For example, an echo client
that connects to a server, receives a packet and echos it can implemented with the
code in Figure 4.4. We have integrated the wrapper into libscapi. Libscapi uses
external OT extension libraries that has its own network code. By incorporating our
wrapper in libscapi, both—libscapi code and OT extension code—can use suitable
transport layer protocols without changing the rest of the code. This is an advantage
of using a common network wrapper. Transport layer protocols can be added to the
wrapper and used by both. With our approach, we want to separate the network
code from the application code.
4.5 Simulations and Evaluations
In this section, we provide the simulation results which are used to understand
the effect of latency, packet loss and bandwidth on the performance of secure
computation protocols (§ 4.5.1). Then, we describe realistic deployment scenarios
(§ 4.5.2) followed by evaluation results obtained in LAN and WAN settings (§ 4.5.3).
4.5.1 Simulations
We simulate two parties performing secure computation on a single machine. We
simulate latency and packet loss using tc qdisc network emulator on a single virtual
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machine (VM) instance from Vultr 2 with a 64-bit single core CPU with 2.6 GHz
and 2 GB RAM. We use the loopback interface for communication. The simulation
results provide the benchmark for the executions in real network setups that we
describe in § 4.5.3.
Past works have compared performances between LAN and WAN settings.
For practical deployment, we need to understand the network conditions in finer
granularity. Through these simulations we aim to understand the impact of latency
and packet loss on 2PC protocols. We simulate latencies between 1ms–300ms, packet
losses between 0.01%–0.05% and bandwidth of 200Mbps, 500Mbps, 1Gbps and
10Gbps. The latencies were chosen to represent communication between machines
on the same network as well as those in different parts of the world. For instance,
the RTT within North America is on average 50ms, RTT between machines on either
side of the Atlantic Ocean is about 100ms and machines placed in North-America and
Asia or EU and Australia is about 300ms. Packet losses were chosen such that they
are representative of realistic packet losses observed in networks 3. Bandwidths were
chosen based on measurements performed using iperf on different networks—local
and across continents.
To understand the effect of latency on 2PC protocols, we run them using TCP,
UDP and SABUL. As reliable communication is required to satisfy the correctness
property of secure computation in real networks, we use UDP to benchmark the
runtimes achievable when the bandwidth is optimally utilized. We use two reliable
transport layer protocols, TCP and SABUL, to show the bandwidth utilisation for
different circuit sizes. All experiments use single thread with AES-NI and the results
are the average of 100 runs.
For a small circuit such as AES, it can be observed in Figure 4.5 that TCP with
Nagle’s algorithm [Nag84] disabled performs better than SABUL. For small circuits,
few kilobytes of data are sent over the network while SABUL is optimized for large
data transfer. For a medium-sized circuit such as SHA256, it can be observed in
Figure 4.5 that TCP performs better than SABUL using JustGarble and half-gate
protocols, while with GLNP15 protocol, the performance of SABUL is better than
TCP as RTT increases. Our observation is due to a combination of reasons: the
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Figure 4.5: Effect of latency on a 10Gbps link for (a) AES (b) SHA256 (c) MinCut
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(a) AES
















































Figure 4.6: Effect of loss on a 10Gbps link for (a) AES (b) SHA256 (c) MinCut
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Figure 4.7: Performance of JustGarble protocol at various bandwidths for (a) AES
(b) SHA256 (c) MinCut.



























































Figure 4.8: Performance of GLNP15 protocol at various bandwidths for (a) AES (b)
SHA256 (c) MinCut.


























Figure 4.9: Performance of SHA256-GLNP15 in different bandwidths and latencies.
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when the amount of data transferred increases. For a large circuit such as MinCut,
the performance of SABUL and TCP is quite different from that observed for AES
and SHA256. It can be observed in Figure 4.5 that SABUL utilizes the available
bandwidth much better than TCP. As many packets are sent from the Garbler to the
Evaluator, the congestion control mechanism plays an important role in controlling
the rate of packet transmission. The increase in latency affects the performance of
TCP more than SABUL as SABUL uses a timer-based selective ACK instead of
reacting to packet level events.
When considering packet loss, for small circuits such as AES, loss rate that we
consider impacts the performance of TCP more than SABUL, as can be seen in
Figure 4.6. For medium-size circuits such as SHA256 and large circuits such as
MinCut, increase in loss rate deteriorates the performance significantly when TCP
is used. On the other hand, SABUL handles packet loss better and the performance
deterioration is very low. For medium and large-sized circuits on a network with at
least 100ms delay, SABUL is more suitable than TCP. We also plot the standard
deviation of the runs as the variance is non-negligible in many of the results.
We also present the effect of bandwidth on the three applications we have
considered. Figure 4.7 is the results for JustGarble protocol while Figure 4.8 is the
results for GLNP15 protocol. As the transport protocol providing better performance
for SHA256 using JustGarble and GLNP15 protocol differs at high latency, finer
measurements can give us insight on the latency at which one transport protocol
performs better than the other at different bandwidths for GLNP15 protocol. In
Figure 4.9, we observe that SABUL performs better than TCP even at a latency of
40ms when the available bandwidth is 10Gbps. As the available bandwidth decreases,
SABUL performs better at lower latencies. For instance, at 200Mbps, SABUL is
better than TCP at 20ms.
4.5.2 Deployment Setups
For performance evaluation, we setup deployments in LAN setting and WAN setting.
These settings provide two common setups of evaluation of secure computation
protocols. In both setups, we use two VM instances from Azure running Ubuntu
16.04, each with a 64-bit Intel Xeon quadcore CPU with 2.4 GHz and 28 GB RAM.
LAN setting. We ran the experiments on two machines located in the same data
centre in the EU using high-bandwidth network and low latency. The latency was
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0.5 ms on a 10Gbps link. The variance was within 10%.
WAN setting. We ran experiments on two pairs of locations with different latencies.
These locations were chosen to show the behaviour of secure computation protocols
with different transport layer protocols as latency increases.
EU-US: In this setting, one machine was located in the EU while the other was
located in central US. The latency was 110ms and the network speed was estimated
to be 1Gbps. The measured speed for a single TCP connection was 200Mbps on
average. The variance was within 15%.
EU-AUS: In this setting, one machine was located in the EU while the other
was located in south-east Australia. The latency was 300ms and the network was
estimated to be 1Gbps. The measured speed for a single TCP connection was
100Mbps on average. Variance of 20% was observed in this setting for secure
computation of AES and SHA256 while the variance for MinCut was 30% for TCP
and 25% for SABUL.
4.5.3 Experimental Evaluations
In this section we present the results obtained by using Transputation for the three
secure computation protocols using TCP and SABUL for communication in LAN
and WAN settings. All experiments were run using single thread and AES-NI. The
results in the following section are the average of 100 runs.
We summarize the experimental results in Table 4.5. The runtimes in the table
include the garbling time, transfer of data from the Garbler to the Evaluator and
the computation of output. In LAN setting, TCP performs best for all circuit sizes.
When Nagle’s algorithm [Nag84] is disabled, the packets are sent as soon as they
arrive at the buffer. Disabling Nagle’s algorithm is advantageous in LAN setting as
the communication is fast and computation accounts for the bulk of the runtime.
In the WAN setting, when 2PC protocols are run between Azure VMs in EU
and US, the circuit size begins to influence the performance. For AES and SHA256,
TCP is still more efficient than SABUL but the tide tilts for MinCut. MinCut using
SABUL is 2.7− 3× faster than TCP. In fact, secure computation of MinCut with
GLNP15 protocol using SABUL is more efficient than using JustGarble or half-gate
protocol using TCP.
In the WAN setting, when the 2PC protocol is run between Azure VMs in
EU and Australia, the influence of latency on 2PC of large circuits becomes much
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Just garble Half-gate GLNP15
Setting TCP SABUL TCP SABUL TCP SABUL
AES
LAN 2.4 187.1 2.9 191.3 7 202.7
EU-US 127.4 403.9 126.3 408.3 130.4 444.2
EU-AUS 312.44 566.84 310.88 580.2 377.92 592.5
SHA256
LAN 13.5 191.9 19.9 226.7 30.5 233.45
EU-US 146.23 332.24 151.99 318.26 266.46 411.96
EU-AUS 362.53 568.22 394.13 587.03 650.44 612.43
MinCut
LAN 255.19 598.2 267.2 740.2 700.8 1255.9
EU-US 2616.59 896.74 2783.6 957.6 4911.89 1802.25
EU-AUS 8204.61 1068.07 8693.57 1163.14 13805.2 2001.27
















Figure 4.10: Comparison of assumptions.
more evident. Secure computation of SHA256 with GLNP15 protocol (with 223,679
ciphertexts) using SABUL is only a little faster than using TCP. Secure computation
of MinCut using SABUL is 7− 8× faster than using TCP. This is significantly more
than the improvements that can be expected from secure computation protocol
improvements [ZRE15]. In Figure 4.10, we provide a comparison of the performance
of TCP and SABUL for the three 2PC protocols that further emphasizes the
improvement in performance by using appropriate transport layer protocols.
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The comparison of TCP and SABUL with respect to increasing ciphertext size
can be seen in Figure 4.1. The impact of latency on the two transport layer protocols
becomes apparent from this figure. When using SABUL, time taken by 2PC protocols
increases by 200ms when latency between the two parties increases by 200ms. The
performance of TCP deteriorates much more significantly as latency increases.
4.6 Related Works
In Figure 4.11, we provide a graphical illustration of related work on 2PC and put
our work in perspective. The landscape of secure computation protocols is broad
and diverse, and different protocols exist for different number of parties, adversarial
models, corruption thresholds, etc. In this chapter, we have chosen to focus on the
most natural case of secure two-party computation.
Garbled Circuits Optimizations. Several works have improved the efficiency
of garbled circuits. The original protocol by Yao [Yao86] requires a transfer of four
ciphertexts per Boolean gate in the circuit, and requires four decryptions for the
evaluation of a garbled gate. The number of decryptions per gate in the evaluation
phase was reduced to one due to the point-and-permute strategy [BMR90], which
also reduces the size of the ciphertexts by a factor of two (approximately). The
main measure of communication complexity of garbling schemes is the number of
ciphertexts which are transmitted per Boolean gate. This was first reduced by Naor,
Pinkas and Sumner [NPS99] to three ciphertexts per gate using the so called 4-3 GRR
technique, and to two ciphertexts per Boolean gate by Pinkas et al. [PSSW09] (4-2
GRR). Thanks to the free-XOR technique [KS08], it is not necessary to transfer any
ciphertexts for XOR (or other linear) gates. Unfortunately, the free-XOR technique
was incompatible with the more advanced 4-2 GRR technique. The two techniques
were finally combined thanks to the half-gate optimization, which combines the
benefit of free-XOR (no ciphertexts for XOR gates) with the advanced 4-2 GRR
technique (only two ciphertexts per AND gate). Unfortunately, the free-XOR
technique is only secure under non-standard cryptographic assumption [CKKZ12]
and, in particular, it requires some form of “circular security” assumption. Using an
even stronger assumption, i.e., fixed-key AES behaves like a random permutation,
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Figure 4.11: Positioning our work within related work.
While efficiency is a crucial aspect in 2PC, some have questioned whether it is
wise to make protocols efficient at the cost of strong assumptions. In particular, we
note that a conservative approach is usually adopted by the industry as it is difficult
to change protocols if vulnerabilities are discovered after deployment. Therefore,
Gueron et al. [GLNP15] provided novel constructions of garbled circuits that can
be proven secure using standard assumptions and that require two ciphertexts for
AND gates (4-2 GRR) and one ciphertext for XOR gates (XOR-1). It concludes
that the price to pay for the stronger security guarantees in practice is much less
than it is in theory. Our evaluations in some sense confirm and strengthen these
conclusions: our experiments show that the choice of the right transport protocol has
a much greater impact on overall efficiency than gambling on security by using non-
standard assumption. In particular (when evaluating large circuits over WAN), using
SABUL plus standard assumptions is 4× faster than using TCP plus non-standard
assumptions.
Nielson, Schneider and Trifiletti [NST17] (in the active security setting) attempts
to improve the communication performance by saturating the network through
the use of multiple parallel TCP connections. Though multiple TCP connections
improves the performance, arbitrary number of parallel connections could lead to
network congestion and lower throughput [HAN02].
Secure Computation Frameworks. Since Fairplay [MNPS04] was implemen-
tation in 2004, various frameworks have been developed for secure 2PC [HEKM11,
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EFLL12, DSZ15]. Currently, a garbled circuit framework with security against pas-
sive and active adversaries is provided in Libscapi [EFLL12] library with the latest
optimizations. Though this chapter only considers Boolean circuits, we note that a
framework for mixed protocol was implemented in ABY [DSZ15]: this framework
combines arithmetic sharing, boolean sharing and garbled circuits, and allows for
conversions between the sharing methods. All previous frameworks focus on secure
computation and use standard TCP socket provided by the operating system.
The recent work of Hastings et al. [HHNZ19] surveys general purpose compilers
for secure computation, which provide high-level abstractions to describe functions in
an intermediate representation (such as a circuit). While it focuses on compilers, we
focus on efficiency of protocol execution. Hence, the two works address orthogonal
problems. The sample programs it chooses do not represent practical MPC use case
and instead attempt to test the usability of the compiler code and how easy it is
to write example code for an application for the compiler. Furthermore, the tests
are performed on standalone environment and do not account for the context, such
as the network condition, in which the protocol is run. The goal of that paper is
not to provide a practical testing framework, neither is it to test the efficiency of
the protocols. Instead, its goal is to make explicit which compilers are written for
experts and which for non-experts.
The recent work by Barak et al. [BHKL18] considers the possibility of providing
MPC as a service where users use the platform to run protocols. They provide an
environment where users can participate in a low-bandwidth MPC protocol using
web-browser or an app on the phone. While they focus on low-bandwidth MPC
protocols, which require multiple rounds, and present evaluations only in LAN
setting, we focus on high-bandwidth constant round 2PC protocols (garbled circuits)
in LAN and WAN settings.
Related work shows that significant progress has been made in computation
complexity of 2PC implementations. When evaluated on a single host the implemen-
tations produce good performance. However, on real networks with other traffic and
concurrent processes, latency and packet loss, the efficiency collapses and implemen-
tations incur prohibitive latency. In particular, we note that no previous work has
considered how to improve secure computation by addressing the issue of transport
layer performances, as addressed in this chapter.
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Securing DNSSEC Keys via Threshold ECDSA
From Generic MPC
The domain name system, standardized in RFC 1034–1035 [Moc87a, Moc87b], maps
domain names to IP addresses and provides a platform for an increasing number
of systems and applications. Unfortunately, security is not part of its design. It is
vulnerable to DNS cache poisoning, where an attacker can introduce incorrect DNS
data to direct end users to a different IP address (often that of the attacker) than
that of the queried domain name [Bel95, AA04, Kam08, SS10, HS13b].
DNS security extensions, standardized in RFC 4033–RFC 4035 [AAL+05a,
AAL+05c, AAL+05b], mitigate cache poisoning using cryptographic techniques.
DNSSEC provides origin authentication and integrity of DNS data, i.e., the machine
that sends a DNS query can verify if the response to DNS queries has originated
from the intended DNS server and has not been altered in transit. A DNS record is
certified using a digital signature scheme, with RSA and ECDSA being the stan-
dardized algorithms in RFC 5702 [Jan09] and RFC 6605 [HW12] respectively. While
RSA is the most commonly used scheme, the need to prevent fragmentation of
UDP responses requires the signing keys to be short. ECDSA is recommended in
RFC 8624 [WS19] as it provides the same level of security as RSA but with much
smaller signatures.
DNSSEC prevents cache poisoning as long as the operator can be trusted. In
practice, very few domain owners run their own authoritative name servers and
manage their zones, and this role is usually outsourced to the DNS operators.
Outsourcing management of zones comes with several benefits, such as increased
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availability and a lower chance of misconfiguration (presumably, because the operators
have specialists at hand that administer their name servers). However, when DNSSEC
is used, this outsourcing also introduces several issues related to key management.
With the introduction of DNSSEC, the operator handles signing keys of domain
owners. This not only means that each domain owner needs to relinquish control of
their signing keys, but it also makes the operator a lucrative target for attackers.
Access to the signing keys gives the operator full access to the zone, i.e., the operator
can potentially change the zone file at will and include malicious information.
Centralization of key management. DNSSEC burdens DNS operators with
the additional task of generating and managing the keys of their users. Recent work
has demonstrated that a large number of domains share the same key [CvRC+17].
Sharing the same key across multiple domains makes the DNS provider a lucrative
target. If the key of one domain is compromised, several other domains can be
compromised as well. Another study [SW17] has shown issues with key generation
that result in keys with inadequate security.
Centralization of operation. A second issue that arises from the problem of
the DNS operator being in-charge of key management is that the entire operation
is centralized. In other words, any guarantee towards integrity of a DNS response
to a query is lost if the operator is corrupted. This implies that DNSSEC does
not prevent attacks from powerful adversaries on the operator, such as nation-state
actors. It is possible that compromised keys can result in a complete takeover, for
instance, of a TLD [RABP17]. E.g., access to the private part of the ZSK allows
an adversary to change the DS record of a child zone and validly sign them. Such
an access gives an adversary the capability to make changes that will result in a
failed verification of the chain of trust [AM07]. In recent years, several examples
of sophisticated attacks on DNS registrars have been observed in Germany [Kre19],
Greece [Cim19] and Sweden [Net19] as part of attacks on DNS infrastructure [Tal19].
Threshold Signatures for DNSSEC
Threshold signatures are a natural candidate to solve the issues outlined above.
A threshold signature scheme distributes a signing key to n signers such that any
subset of at least t signers can sign a message. Since the signing key is distributed
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among multiple signers, it will remain private as long as at least t servers remain
uncompromised. Moreover, the threshold signing scheme can be made secure against
tampering to prevent a malicious operator from compromising a response.
While threshold RSA has previously been studied for fault tolerance in DNSSEC,
threshold ECDSA has not been used for DNSSEC in spite of an increased interest
in threshold ECDSA in recent years [Lin17, LNR18, GG18, DKLS18, DKLS19]. All
of these recent works motivate the problem of threshold ECDSA in the context of
crypto-currencies, a problem that is substantially different from DNSSEC: First,
recent works on threshold ECDSA focus on full threshold, i.e., privacy of the signing
key is maintained when up to t = n − 1 signers collaborate. Second, the focus
has typically been on malicious security, i.e., signers are not assumed to behave
according to the signing protocol. However, it is possible to design faster protocols
by relaxing some of these security guarantees by requiring an honest majority, or
assuming that signers do not deviate from the signing protocol. The diverse context
in which DNS is used can benefit from solutions that are not limited to a specific
threat model. Furthermore, there are only a handful of DNS operators that are
typically used per zone in the world of DNS, while the identity and the number of
parties involved in cryptocurrencies can vary widely. Threshold signatures are more
efficient for small number of parties, which allows us to develop a practical solution
to a pressing security problem.
In the real world application of DNSSEC, where multiple operators (usually, two
or three) serve a domain, the possibility of only one of them being controlled by an
adversary is reasonable as operators are often corporations located in different parts
of the world and adhere to local laws. In such a setting, a full threshold protocol
may not be necessary, and a protocol that assumes an honest-majority among the
operators is sufficient. For instance, for a domain with three operators, we assume
that none of the operators collude. Moreover, DNS operators are bound by legal
contracts with their customers and they provide service according to this contract.
These legal bounds allow us to consider operators that do not act maliciously because
such an action would be a breach of contract. However, in such a case we still need
to protect keys stored at the operator as employees can snoop on them.
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Contributions
A summary of our contributions:
• We present a transformation for generic MPC protocols over a field Zp to
protocols over an elliptic curve group of order p, as is required for ECDSA.
This transformation only introduces a small overhead in terms of efficiency
and preserves the security properties of the original MPC protocol. We obtain
several different instantiations of threshold ECDSA for different corruption
models (honest or dishonest majority and passive or active adversaries) that
can be used to compute a large number of signatures at a very low cost. This
transformation can have other useful applications beyond ECDSA signing.
• The generality of our approach results in efficient key generation for ECDSA,
which has been expensive in most of the prior works. This is beneficial in our
setting as operators that manage many zones will generate many keys.
• We implement this transformation in MP-SPDZ 1 [Dat19] to support threshold
signing with ECDSA in many different threat models. We benchmark each
instantiation against state-of-the-art protocols for threshold signing and show
that they either perform as efficiently or better than customized threshold
ECDSA protocols.
• We perform the first measurement study to understand the extent to which
multiple operators are used in the Internet. We find that 40% of the domains
in the Alexa Top-100 use multiple operators while the proportion of domains
in the top-million is 3.5%. Our measurements show that there are thousands
of domains that use multiple operators where our threshold ECDSA protocols
can be used.
• We describe and implement a full system, by integrating MP-SPDZ with Knot,
which can be used by multiple DNS operators for the purpose of implementing
DNSSEC, such that no operator has access to the signing key.
1SPDZ pronounced as ‘speedz’.
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Chapter Outline
Section 5.1 presents a measurement study we performed. We show that a significant
number of domains use multiple operators, which allows them to use our solution.
Section 5.2 outlines our system and threat model. Section 5.3 presents our technical
contribution towards designing efficient threshold signing protocol. Section 5.4
shows how we integrate our signing protocol into a well-known DNSSEC application.
Section 5.5 presents a number of experiments and compares the results with prior
work. Section 5.6 discusses how our work relates to prior works.
5.1 Quantifying Multiple Operators
Since the large distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on Dyn [DYN16] and
NS1 [Bee16] in 2016 that overwhelmed these managed DNS operators, many domains
are using multiple operators to increase the redundancy of the zone so that they do
not fall victim to another DDoS attack. However, no recent work has measured the
number of domains that make use of multiple operators. As we propose to use our
multiparty ECDSA protocol for DNSSEC zone signing, we measure the extent to
which multiple operators are used on the Internet. We consider a domain to have
more than one operator if the DNS name servers of the same domain are hosted by
an entirely different DNS operator.
5.1.1 Data Collection Methodology
If a domain name is configured to be served by three DNS name servers, we check
whether it is managed by the same operator. For our purpose, we are interested in
nameservers run by different operators and not necessarily name servers placed at
different locations. For instance, some domains might use two operators who are
geographically located in close proximity to each other; sometimes, even in the same
data centre. We are interested in the setting with different operators as they do not
have a business relationship with each other that will allow them to pass on copies
of signing keys. Hence, being geographically close does not eliminate the need to
run a secure signing protocol. Some domains use a single operator that has name
servers at different locations. In principle, a multiparty ECDSA protocols can be
used in this setting as well because it provides better security than simply storing a
copy of the signing key on each name server.
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Our measurements were conducted using the Alexa Global Top-1m (top 1 million
websites) list as the dataset [Ale19]. The list was downloaded on 12 July 2019. We
ran scans on the same date on all the domains in the dataset and requested its
NS records. For each NS record we also obtain the first associated A record. On
obtaining the NS record, we have the list of authoritative name servers. We compare
the sub-domains of country code TLDs, country code second-level domains and
generic TLDs. E.g., if the two name servers of a domain are dns1.p09.nsone.net.
and ns1.p43.dynect.net., then we compare nsone and dynect. However, we do
not only compare the second-level domain names. If there is a third name server
for the same domain at pdns6.ultradns.co.uk., then we compare ultradns with
nsone and dynect.
To measure the number of domains that use multiple operators, we need to know
the owners of the authoritative name servers. Though it is possible to obtain this
information from the WHOIS database using the A records we collected, the informa-
tion obtained does not have a consistent schema and is heavily rate limited [LFS+15].
Hence, we use the WHOIS database to only check information for Alexa Top-1k; for
the rest of Alexa Top-1m, we take an approach similar to Chung et al. [CvRC+17]
and rely on the NS records to indicate the DNS operator. We made manual checks
to make sure that subsidiaries of large corporations are not classified as separate
operators. For instance, Chinese online shopping website taobao.com is a subsidiary
of the Alibaba group, and we found that one of their name servers is owned by
Alibaba and hence, we classified them as the same operator.
If the result of our comparison is that the authoritative name servers are different,
then we mark them as different operators. However, if they are the same, we consider
the A records as well. If the A records are in different IP address blocks, then we
check whether they are owned by the same organization or not. In the case that the
IP address is owned by the same organization, then we consider the name servers to
be run by the same operator and otherwise, we consider the name servers to be run
by different operators. Note that large organizations such as Facebook and Google
run dedicated networks that provide DNS redundancy. However, as they are run
by the same organization, we do not account for them in our list of domains with
multiple operators.
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Misconf/NR Only 1 More than 1
Figure 5.1: Proportion of domains with multiple operators.
5.1.2 Data Analysis
We have classified domains as having a single operator (Only 1), multiple operators
(More than 1), no response (NR) and misconfigured (Misconf). An NR classification
refers to the case where, during our scans, we did not receive a response from the name
server list within a 15-second timeout. Misconf refers to zones that are misconfigured
due to mistakes and/or typos. More precisely, we first observed whether we received
an A record for the NS record. If we instead receive an error, we then checked the NS
record for completeness. If, during this check, we encounter mistakes or typos, the
domain is marked as misconfigured. E.g., just ds0. was configured as one of the
authoritative name servers for the domain oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com.
We present our results from the Alexa Global Top 1 million list as well as its
subsets in Figure 5.1. We did not receive a response to our queries from 3, 24, 208,
60775 domains in the Top-100, Top-1k, Top-10k and Top-1m respectively. Although
we did not find any misconfigured domains in the Top-1k, we found 13 misconfigured
domains in the Top-10k and 2483 domains in Top-1m. We observe that 40% of
the domains in Alexa Top-100 have more than one operator while the proportion
reduces as we move down the Top-1m list. 20.3%, 9.2% and 3.5% of the domains in
the Top-1k, Top-10k and Top-1m have multiple operators for their domain. Hence,
we conclude from our measurements that there are thousands of domains that use
multiple operators and that can easily use our threshold ECDSA protocols.
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5.2 System and Threat Model
The diversity of the DNS ecosystem should be reflected in our system and threat
model. For the system model, we assume a small number of operators that serve a
single domain. As seen in the previous section, this setting is common in practice,
in particular among popular domains. For the threat model, we take the two issues—
centralization of key management and operation—outlined in the introduction as
our starting point. Before we continue, we describe the security properties that we
address with our threat model:
1. Key Privacy. This is our baseline. Key privacy states that signing key
remains private in the event that a server is compromised. We note that
this property is relevant in a number of different contexts. For example, this
property states that a signing key isn’t exposed to a system administrator, or
to anyone who obtains a decommissioned (but improperly cleaned) server.
2. Operational Integrity. Besides keeping keys secret, we may also want to
uphold the integrity of operation. By operational integrity, we mean that only
two situations can occur: Either operation proceeds as normal, that is, the
right zone is signed, or nothing is signed. In other words, at best, a malicious
operator can only disrupt operation, i.e., it performs a denial of service attack
but it cannot sign zones with bogus information. Notice that key privacy is
subsumed in operational integrity. If it is possible to extract the signing key,
then no guarantee about the integrity can be made since a single operator can
sign any zone it manages.
5.2.1 System and Communication Model
Intuitively, our system model can be viewed as distributing the task of a single
operator among multiple operators. We assume that the operators can securely
communicate with each other, e.g., using a TLS connection where both endpoints
are authenticated. Although a larger pool of operators increases the availability
of the domain, domain owners also need to consider the cost-benefit trade-off. As
two or three operators provides sufficient redundancy, we envision our system to
be used in the setting where the number of DNS operators per domain is n = 2 or
n = 3. These operators can be distributed in a single location, communicating over
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a LAN, or they can be distributed globally. Finally, we assume that the servers are
sufficiently separated, i.e., a compromise of one server does not automatically lead
to a compromise of another server.
5.2.2 Threat Model
We consider an adversary that is capable of compromising a single server. Thus,
when n = 2, the adversary controls half the servers, and when n = 3, the adversary
controls a minority (since 2 servers remain honest). We distinguish between two
standard adversarial behaviours described in § 2.1. The first type of adversary, called
passive, follows the prescribed protocol. The second adversary, called active, may
behave arbitrarily and may not follow the protocol. These two adversarial types
capture our security properties. If we only desire key privacy, then security against
a passive adversary suffices. If we want operational integrity as well, then we must
also secure ourselves against active adversaries. Indeed, it is exactly against such an
adversary that the integrity of operation becomes an issue.
5.3 Threshold ECDSA
In this section, we describe ECDSA in § 5.3.1. Next, we describe a standard MPC
functionality over fields and then introduce extensions to compute on groups in
§ 5.3.2. Then, we describe how we provide active security in § 5.3.3. Once we have
all the pieces, we describe the complete multiparty threshold ECDSA protocol in
§ 5.3.4 and its security analysis in § 5.3.5.
5.3.1 ECDSA
For zone signing, the two most widely used signing algorithms are RSA and ECDSA.
RSA continues to be widely deployed while the rate of adoption of ECDSA is
increasing since it was standardized for DNSSEC in 2012 [HW12, vRJS16]. We
focus on ECDSA [KG13], which is parameterized by a subgroup G ⊆ E(K) of prime
order p of some curve E(K), where G is a generator of G. We use Zp to denote a
field of order p and H to denote a hash function mapping messages unto elements of
Zp. We describe the signature scheme that is represented by a tuple (KGen,Sig,Vf)
where:
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• KGen(1λ)
1. Sample at random sk← Zp as the signing key.
2. Compute the public key pk = sk ·G as the public verification key.
3. Output the keys (sk, pk).
• Sig(sk,M)
1. Sample an instance key k ← Zp at random.
2. Compute R = (rx, ry) = k ·G. If rx ≡ 0 (mod p), go back to Step 1.
3. Compute s = k−1(H(M) + sk · rx).
4. Output the signature σ = (rx, s).
• Vf(pk,M, σ)
1. Parse σ as (rx, s).
2. Compute (r′x, r′y) = s−1(H(M) ·G+ rx · pk).
3. Output 1 iff r′x = rx.
We can check that Sig produces a valid signature:
s−1(H(M) ·G+ rx · pk)
= k(H(M) + sk · rx)−1(H(M) ·G+ rx · pk)
= k ·G · ((H(M) + sk · rx)−1(H(M) + sk · rx))
= k ·G = (rx, ry).
5.3.2 Secure Computation on Groups
We assume an MPC engine supporting the standard commands of the arithmetic
black-box (ABB) functionality as described in Figure 5.2, where the notation [a]
indicates that the value a is secret-shared, i.e., no party has access to it. The security
model of an MPC protocol is parametrized by two parameters. The first parameter
is whether the adversary can control at least half, or less than half the parties. The
former is called dishonest majority, while the latter is called honest majority. When
one server is corrupted, an honest majority protocol would correspond a setting




• A command ([a], [b], [c]) ← RandMul() that generates appropriate repre-
sentations of a random tuple of secret shared values a, b, c ∈ Zp with
c = ab.
• A command [c]← Mul([a], [b]) that returns c = ab. This is typically imple-
mented using one invocation of RandMul and Beaver’s re-randomization
technique (See § 2.3.2).
• A command [a]← Rand() that generates appropriate representation of a
random value a ∈ Zp.
• A command a ← Open([a]) that publicly reconstructs a (or outputs a
special symbol ⊥ denoting abort).
• Linear computation for the [·] representation: given the shares [a], [b] and
public scalars x, y ∈ Zp, the parties can compute [c] = x · [a] + y · [b] “for
free”, i.e., the computation does not involve communicating with the other
parties.
Figure 5.2: Arithmetic black-box functionality.
parameter is the corruption model: The two cases—active and passive—correspond
to our description in § 5.2.2.
We present an extension to the ABB that extends its capabilities to secure
computation over an arbitrary abelian group of order p. In some sense, this shows
that the actual representation of the algebraic structure used to perform MPC is
irrelevant as long as it is possible to perform linear operations. This generalization
of arithmetic MPC has also been described independently by Smart and Talibi
Alaoui [SA19], and might have applications in other contexts.
We use this idea to perform MPC in subgroup G. This extension comes at no
extra cost in terms of communication and a small increase in computation complexity
corresponding to standard operations in the subgroup of the curve. Consider a
protocol implementing the ABB in Figure 5.2 and assume that the shares [a] are
elements of Zp. The idea is to let each party map their share of [a] to a curve point
of order p by locally computing Ai = ai ·G, where ai is party i’s share of a. This
mapping, being a homomorphism, preserves linearity such that Ai is a share of a ·G
with the same properties as the original Zp sharing [a]. Let 〈a〉 denote a share of
63
Chapter 5. Securing DNSSEC Keys via Threshold ECDSA From Generic MPC
a ·G. Then, we add the following two commands to the ABB in Figure 5.2:
• A command 〈a〉 ← Convert([a]) that converts a representation of the shared
value a in Zp to a representation of the value a ·G in the group G.
• A command a ·G← Open(〈a〉) that recovers the secret shared point.
These two commands, along with the functionality of the original ABB, which
provide secure computation over Zp, are sufficient to give us a protocol for secure
computation over the group G. If we consider the sharing [a] as a vector with
elements from Zp, we get the following useful properties:
• Linearity is preserved, i.e., given the shares 〈a〉, 〈b〉 and scalars x, y ∈ Zp, we
can locally compute 〈c〉 = x〈a〉+ y〈b〉.
• If the Open procedure for [·] shares relies only on group operations in Zp,
then we can implement Open for 〈·〉 shares by using the corresponding group
operations of G. This property follows from Convert being structure preserving.
• Secret scalar multiplication by public point is possible by noting that Convert
defines an action of Zp on G, i.e., [a] · P for a P ∈ G is a local operation that
results in 〈a · logP (G)〉. Note that opening this share will result in a · P .
• Finally, given [x], 〈y〉 and a multiplication tuple [a], [b], [c], it is possible to
compute 〈xy〉 tweaking Beaver’s circuit randomization (see § 2.3.2) as follows:
1. e = Open([a] + [x]),
2. D = Open(Convert([b]) + 〈y〉), and
3. 〈xy〉 = Convert([c]) + e〈y〉+ [x]D − eD.
Note that the final property is not required for the applications in this thesis,
but it could be of independent interest.
The properties of Convert and Open, as well as the functionality of the underlying
ABB that provides secure computation over Zp is sufficient to give us a protocol
for secure computation over G. This extended ABB, which we will call ABB+, is




• RandMul(), Mul([·], [·]), Rand(), Open([·]) as described in Figure 5.2.
• A command 〈a〉 ← Convert([a]) that converts a representation of a secret
[a] over the field Zp into a representation of the secret 〈a〉 over the group
G.
• A command a ·G← Open(〈a〉) that reconstructs a curve point a ·G from
a secret representation 〈a〉.
Figure 5.3: Extended arithmetic black-box.
5.3.3 Active Security using SPDZ like MACs
In the previous section, we showed that we can easily extend a protocol of Zp with
functionality for secure computation over a subgroup of G ⊆ E(K) of order p. A
natural question to ask is whether the active security guarantees of the Zp protocol
extend to the G protocol. We answer this question in the affirmative by showing
that the MAC scheme of SPDZ [DPSZ12], which is unconditionally secure, can be
used to provide authentication of shares in G (i.e., 〈·〉 shares) as well.
SPDZ recap. We recall the SPDZ protocol and its security using the description
from Damgård et al. [DKL+12]. In SPDZ, a value a ∈ Zp is shared as
[a] = ((a1, . . . , aN ), (γ(a)i, . . . , γ(a)N )),
where party i holds the pair (ai, γ(a)i), and where a =
∑
i ai and α · a = γ(a) =∑
i γ(a)i. The value α ∈ Zp is a global MAC key that is secret shared using a different
scheme, JαK. The details of this are not important for the following discussion; it
suffices to say that each party has a share αi, such that
∑
i αi = α, as well as other
information to make this sharing secure. The global MAC key is unknown to all
parties and provides a notion of authentication of the shares.
We recap the opening phase of the SPDZ protocol for a single value, i.e., the
part where the parties check if the output was computed correctly 2:
1. Each Pi has input αi, their share of the global MAC key, and γ(a)i, their share
of the MAC on a partially opened value a3.
2Several openings can be batched. see the original paper [DKL+12] for more details.
3A partial opening reveals the value but not the MAC.
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2. Each Pi computes τi = γi(a)− αia and broadcasts a commitment com(τi).
3. All parties open com(τi), and compute chk =
∑
i τi. If chk 6= 0, output ⊥ and
abort.
Suppose a′ = a + ε, i.e., the adversary adds an error ε 6= 0 during the partial
opening. In addition, if the adversary lies about its MAC in Step 2 of SPDZ opening
phase, an error that we denote as ∆, then the adversary is successful if ∆ = ∑i τi.







γi(a)− αia = αε.
Since ε = (a− a′) 6= 0, then α = ∆ε−1, which happens with probability at most 1/p
due to the random choice of α.
SPDZ-like computation over an elliptic curve. In the remainder of this
section, we will use the shorthand notation cv(a) = Convert(a) interchangeably for
convenience. Consider the most natural modification possible to obtain a notion of
a SPDZ-sharing 〈·〉 over G from a SPDZ-sharing [·] over Zp by applying cv to all
local shares. We define 〈a〉 as the vector
〈a〉 = ((cv(ai), . . . , cv(aN )), (cv(γ(a)i), . . . , cv(γ(a)N ))),












γ(a)i) = cv(α · a).
Therefore, we can use the same JαK to authenticate the Converted share as well.
More precisely, we consider a modified opening procedure that works as follows4:
1. Let αi be the share of the key held by Pi, and Γi = cv(γ(a)i) be the shares of
the MAC on A = cv(a).
4We describe the procedure for a single value. It can be extended to support batching.
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2. Each Pi computes Σi = Γi − αiA and broadcasts a commitment com(Σi).
3. Open com(Σi), compute chk = Σ1 + · · ·+ ΣN . If chk 6= 0, output ⊥ and abort.
Due to the linearity of the group operations, if the adversary opens A′ 6= A, then
the check only passes with probability 1/p. In a nutshell, we are taking a secure
linear MAC procedure, and raising all the MACs and values in the exponent.
5.3.4 Multiparty ECDSA Protocol using ABB+
We recall the protocol of Gennaro and Goldfeder [GG18] and show that it can be
computed by our extended arithmetic black box functionality. The main issue with
computing ECDSA signatures securely is calculating k−1 such that it does not reveal
information about k. However, the inversion trick by Bar-Ilan and Beaver [BB89]
can be used here:
1. Suppose each party has a share of two random values b, k and their product,
i.e., ([b], [k], [c]) where c = b · k.
2. The parties Open([c]) = c.
3. They locally compute c−1[b] = [(k · b)−1b] = [k−1]
Thus the price to pay for the inversion, which is the most expensive part of every
threshold ECDSA protocol, is essentially generating a random multiplication triple
using RandMul, and using Convert to compute the value R = Open(Convert([k])).
The other value we need is a sharing of sk/k. Given [k−1] it is possible to compute
[sk/k] very efficiently by performing a single secure multiplication.
The full protocol using the ABB+ now follows: We consider a setting with a
number of servers S = {S1, . . . , SN} and a number of users U = {U1, . . . , U`}. Our
protocol has four phases:
1. We generate a random secret key using [sk] = Rand(), and then use it to
generate the public key by running pk = Open(Convert([sk])) (Alternatively,
users can pick their own keys and input them to the servers in S).
2. We have two preprocessing phases. The first preprocessing phase is independent
of the users and the messages to be signed, and serves to generate the values
[k−1] and 〈k〉 that are required for generating any signature;
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3. The second preprocessing phase depends on the user and computes [skj/k],
where skj is the signing key of user Uj .
4. Finally, generating a signature using the output of the preprocessing and the
user’s signing key involves a linear computation followed by an opening.
5.3.5 Security Analysis
We show the details of the full protocol in Figure 5.4. The security of the protocol
follows directly from the security of the underlying ABB scheme, and from the
assumption that ECDSA is a secure signature scheme. This assumption has also
been used by Doerner et al. [DKLS18, DKLS19].
It is possible to open R in the user independent stage of the protocol in Figure 5.4
before the message is known. However, in that case, the security does not directly
reduce to the security of ECDSA as the adversary is allowed to choose its message
dependent on the nonce R. We can handle such an adaptive adversary such that
the reduction will try to guess which of the nonces the adversary will use, and act
accordingly. If the guess is correct, then the reduction proceeds as in the non-adaptive
case. Otherwise, it fails. Since the adversary can generate only a polynomial number
of nonces, security is still preserved, but the reduction is not tight anymore. Canetti,
Makriyannis and Peled [CMP20] treat this topic in more detail.
5.4 Multiparty Zone Signing System
In this section, we describe the integration of our threshold ECDSA implementation
in a DNS name server before describing the important operations. We implement
several variants of our threshold ECDSA protocol on top of MP-SPDZ [Dat19]
and have used Crypto++ as the library for computation over elliptic curves. We
integrate MP-SPDZ with DNS administrative name servers. For DNS name server
software, we use Knot DNS [Kno19] as it has the possibility to perform automated
key management and it comes with extensive documentation. For the setting where
the registrar is the DNS operator, we propose that registrars interact with other
registrars in the zone signing protocol. We describe the multi-operator setting in
this section and, where necessary, we note the difference if the operators are also the
registrar.
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Threshold ECDSA in the ABB+ Hybrid Model
Key Generation. ([skj ], pkj)← KGen(1λ)
To generate a key for user Uj , either Uj supplies the sharing [skj ], or the servers
run [skj ]← Rand(). The public key is computed as pkj = Open(Convert([skj ])).
User independent preprocessing. (〈k〉, [k−1])← PInd()
1. The servers run ([a], [b], [c])← RandMul().
2. Run c← Open([c]).
3. Let [k−1] = [a].
4. Define 〈k〉 ← Convert([b]) · c−1.
5. Output (〈k〉, [k−1]).
User dependent preprocessing. (〈k〉, [k−1], [sk′j ])← PDep([skj ], 〈k〉, [k−1])
1. Take as input [skj ] (the sharing of the secret key of user Uj) and (〈k〉, [k−1])
(an unused tuple from the previous phase).
2. Compute [sk′j ] = [skj/k]← Mul([k−1], [skj ]).
3. Output a final tuple (〈k〉, [k−1], [sk′j ]).
Signing. σ ← Sig(〈k〉, [k−1], [sk′j ],M)
1. Take an unused preprocessed tuple (〈k〉, [k−1], [sk′j ]) for Uj and the message
M to be signed.
2. Run R← Open(〈k〉) = (bc−1) ·G = a−1 ·G = k ·G.
3. Let (rx, ry)← R.
4. Compute [s] = H(M) · [k−1] + rx · [sk′j ].
5. Open s← Open([s]) and output the signature σ = (rx, s) or σ = ⊥.
Figure 5.4: Full protocol for threshold ECDSA signatures using ABB+.
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Figure 5.5: Setup at DNS operator.
5.4.1 Setup
Figure 5.5 shows the architecture of the proposed DNSSEC signing system at a
DNS operator. In our DNSSEC signing system, each operator serves a name server,
runs a threshold ECDSA module and has two key stores: one to store the keys
for particular zones and another to store the key material associated with other
operators. We consider three name servers operated by independent DNS operators,
all of which support ECDSA with SHA256 message digest. We do not change the
operation of Knot DNS apart from the parts involved in DNSSEC key generation,
key rollover and zone signing. Communication between the name server and the
threshold ECDSA module is performed using a message queue.
We note that although we describe our automated system where the DNS opera-
tors handle key generation/rollover in addition to zone signing, it is possible to use
our system in the setting where the domain owner handles the key generation/rollover.
In that case, the only change would be that the domain owner generates the key
pair and the private key shares and sends them to the DNS operators.
5.4.2 Key Generation/Rollover
In the key generation/rollover phase, when new keys need to be generated, each
operator generates a signing key share [skj ] for the zone and runs the key generation
as shown in Figure 5.4. At the end of this phase, the public key is added to DNSKEY
record of the zone at all the operators and the signing key share [skj ] is stored in
the keystore for the zones. In addition, a tag that indicates the DNS operators
associated with this signing key share is stored. E.g., Operator A would store a
70
5.4. Multiparty Zone Signing System
tag T (B,C) along with the key shares associated with Operator B and Operator C.
This makes it easy for the threshold ECDSA module to contact the corresponding
DNS operators during the signature generation phase. Note that the key generation
for ZSK and KSK is the same except that in the case of KSK, the domain owner
generates the DS record and sends it to the registrar, who then submits it to the
registry. When the registrar is one of the DNS operators of the zone, then the
registrar can directly submit the DS record.
5.4.3 Signing
As shown in Figure 5.4, our signing protocol has three phases: the first is independent
of the zone to be signed, while the second is independent of the RRset, but dependent
on the zone to be signed. Each of the three phases involve the three steps that are
shown in Figure 5.6. In Step 1, the threshold ECDSA module receives the input for
the phase from the name server and the tag from the key store. In Step 2, the MPC
protocol for the phase is run between the threshold ECDSA module of the three
operators. In Step 3, the output of the preprocessing phases are sent to the key
store (Step 3p) while the output of the signing phase, RRSIG, is sent to the name
server to store in the zone file (Step 3s). We note that the threshold ECDSA module
runs in the background and periodically polls the name server so that it is always
available to sign.
Accountability of DNS operators. When the DNS operators serve a domain
independently, it is straightforward to identify the operator in the case of malfunction.
When we use our multiparty zone signing system, accountability requires a few extra
checks. The protocols we implement are in the security-with-abort model. In the
case of honest majority protocols, we can detect the malicious behaviour by local
checking. As two operators are sufficient to generate the final signature, they can
check which party sent corrupted inputs in case the protocol fails with the third party.
This mechanism only works in the online phase. For the preprocessing phase, we
need more checks that requires us to instantiate with protocols in identifiable-abort
model. Similarly, a protocol in identifiable-abort model is required for dishonest
majority and it makes auditing by an external party possible as well. Although
there are black-box extensions from abort to identifiable-abort protocols, these are
not yet efficient [CHOR18].
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Figure 5.6: Zone signing.
Implication for DNS Operators. In our system, the DNS operators do not need
to be online any more than they already are in existing systems. DNS operators in
existing systems remain online to respond to DNS queries. Many DNS operators sign
DNS responses on-the-fly and, hence, they are already equipped with signing systems
that are online. In our system they will not only respond to DNS queries, they will
also run MPC with other registrar/operators to create RRSIG. Our threshold ECDSA
protocols have an overhead—both in terms of communication and computation—that
depends on the concrete threat and system model. We discuss the overheads as part
of our benchmarks in § 5.5. It is also worth noting that the operators need not rely
on secure hardware to store their user’s keys anymore, which may bring down both
the cost and complexity for a DNS operator.
Implication for DNS resolvers. Proper functioning of the DNSSEC ecosystem
requires both the signing and the validation to work. Deploying changes at DNS
resolvers, who perform validation, is extremely hard as numerous resolver software
need to be changed. Fortunately, no change is required at the validating resolver to
use our solution. Every time the domain is queried at the authoritative name server,
the signatures for the zone need to be verified at the resolvers for the chain of trust
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to be established. Though three operators are involved in the signing process, the
signature can be verified with the same DNSKEY, irrespective of the operator which
initiated the signing process. If the DNS resolver obtains the DNSKEY records from
Operator A and stores it in the cache, then it will be able to authenticate a response
from Operator B for the same domain, as the two operators have the same DNSKEY
for the zone. The resolver will be able to verify the chain of trust irrespective of the
operator responded to the query.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we report on several benchmarks of our protocol and compare with
prior work of both signature generation and key generation times. We implement
six instantiations of our protocol, which support different system and threat models,
in MP-SDPZ [Dat19]. For n = 3 we have Rep3, Shamir (passive security) and
Mal. Rep3 and Mal. Shamir (active security). For n = 2, we use MASCOT and
MASCOT– (MASCOT minus). We discuss these protocols in § 5.5.1.
We benchmark our implementation with n = 2 and n = 3, depending on whether
the underlying protocol requires an honest majority or not. In our benchmarking,
we split the protocol between preprocessing (including both preprocessing phases in
Figure 5.4) and online signing phase. We measure both the throughput (based on
batches of 10000 signatures), and the time for generating a single signature given
a preprocessed tuple. Many of these protocols have asymmetric communication
patterns and, thus, we report the maximum execution time, instead of the average.
Experimental setup. We used VMs from AWS c5.2xlarge in three settings:
LAN setting or Colocation: All servers located in the same region in Ireland.
WAN setting: The servers are located in two sets of locations.
Continent: Servers are located in the same continent. We used servers in
Ireland, Paris and London. For two-party protocols, benchmarks were
run between Ireland and Paris.
World: Servers are located in different continents. We used one server each in
Ireland, North Virginia and Seoul. For two-party protocols, the servers in
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Ireland and Seoul were used. The largest RTT between any two servers
in the world setting is approximately 240ms.
RTT for our setup can be found in Table 5.1. All benchmarks were run with a
single thread.
5.5.1 Protocols
As we discussed in § 2.3.2, we use replicated secret sharing and Shamir’s secret
sharing for honest-majority protocols. Rep3 and Mal. Rep3 are replicated secret
sharing-based three party protocols in semi-honest and malicious security models
respectively. Shamir and Mal. Shamir are Shamir’s secret sharing based protocols
in semi-honest and malicious security models respectively. While we benchmark
the three-party variant of these protocols, these protocols can be use for n > 3.
MP-SDPZ implementation supports n > 3 for Shamir. Replicated secret sharing
does not scale well for more parties as the size of shares increases exponentially with
the number for parties [FLNW17]. Hence, only the three-party variant of replicated
secret sharing based protocol is implemented in MP-SPDZ.
For the dishonest majority protocols, we use MASCOT and MASCOT–. MAS-
COT [KOS16] is an efficient OT-based preprocessing method for SPDZ protocols.
It includes checks to detect attacks and it is secure against malicious adversaries.
MASCOT– is an optimization of MASCOT. We describe MASCOT– in § 5.5.2.
5.5.2 MASCOT– Optimizations
Our MASCOT– protocol is obtained by making a number of function specific
optimizations to MASCOT [KOS16]. Threshold signatures are a special case of
MPC where the correctness of the output can trivially be determined by observing
the output itself, by verifying the signature. This is a well known trick which has
previously been used to optimize many threshold ECDSA protocols in the literature.
We can similarly optimize our protocol by using an “optimistic” version of the Open
command when running Step 3 of the Signing subroutine in Figure 5.4.
SPDZ opening. We save a round of communication while opening as we do not
need to check correctness of the MACs. An adversary might attempt an additive
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AB (ms) AC (ms) BC (ms)
Colocated 0.07 0.07 0.08
Continent 11.51 16.98 8.2
World 240.0 71.0 181.1
Table 5.1: RTT in milliseconds between the servers used. A is always Ireland, while
B is Paris and Seoul in the “Continent”, respectively “World” setting, and C is
London and N.Virginia in the “Continent”, respectively “World” settings.
attack, which may result in an invalid signature. However, the protocol does not
leak any information about the secret key.
Beaver multiplication. Suppose the adversary can perform an additive attack
during multiplication, i.e., x+ a+ ε1 and y + b+ ε2 for independent ε1 and ε2. A
multiplication becomes
(x+a+ ε1) · (y+ b+ ε2)− (x+a+ ε1) · b− (y+ b+ ε2) ·a+ab = xy+ ε1y+ ε2x+ ε1ε2.
This permits a selective failure attack. E.g., ε2 = 0, ε1 6= 0 then the multiplication
is correct if and only if y = 0. However, multiplications are only used on k−1 and sk,
both of which are of high entropy.
5.5.3 Comparison with Prior Work
We present a comparison of our protocols with two industry protocols from Un-
bound [Unb19] and KZen [KZe19], as well as the two-party protocol of Doerner et
al. [DKLS18] (DKLS) in Table 5.2. The numbers reported for our protocols corre-
spond to running all three phases in Figure 5.4. We see that MASCOT– performs
as well as the fastest prior protocol in DKLS, with the same security guarantees, in
the LAN setting. However, with more servers, some of our protocols perform better
in the LAN setting. In our two WAN settings, DKLS outperforms our protocols as
it requires only 2 messages (1 round of communication) whereas our fastest protocol
(Rep3) requires 3. Interestingly, the simplicity of our key generation protocol is
apparent, and in all cases (except MASCOT–) key generation is faster than signing.
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5.5.4 Key Generation
We also benchmark the key generation phase as that is typically the more expensive
phase in prior works [GG18, LNR18]. With our approach, generating a shared key
amounts to running any protocol for generating a secret shared field element [sk],
followed by opening the result of Convert[sk]. Timings for key generation are shown
in Table 5.3. For our honest majority protocol (n = 3,) generating a secret key
requires only 1 or 2 rounds of communication. The opening procedure of MASCOT
and MASCOT– is more costly than the rest of the protocols. The heuristics used
to obtain MASCOT– cannot be used when generating keys and, hence, the key
generation time is about the same for both.
5.5.5 Amortizing Signing
Finally, we analyze the cost of signing when amortization is applied, something
that no prior work has considered 5. Table 5.4 shows how many signing tuples
each protocol can generate per second. The signing times reported in this table
correspond to computing a signature when amortization is taken into account. A
signing tuple corresponds to the output of the user dependent preprocessing phase
in Figure 5.4. We note that, for almost all protocols, amortized signing corresponds
essentially to a single round of communication.
5.5.6 Overhead for Operators
The storage overhead can be derived from the sizes of a share for a given protocol.
For Mal. Rep3, MASCOT and Rep3 each share consists of two Zp elements, while
for the rest a share is a single element. Thus, for the former three the overhead for
storing the signing keys is doubled. A signing tuple consists of two Zp shares and
one G share. For example, Rep3 needs to store roughly 2 · 4 · 32 bytes per signature,
assuming a 256-bit prime. Communication per party is between 177 and 354 bytes,
depending on the protocol (this number was derived experimentally).
5Although it might be possible to split some of the protocols in previous work into a preprocessing





n Sig(ms) KGen(ms) Sig(ms) KGen(ms) Sig(ms) KGen (ms)
Rep3 3 2.78 1.45 27.22 29.44 367.87 291.32
Shamir 3 3.02 1.39 78.75 35.52 1140.09 486.82
Mal. Rep3 3 3.45 1.57 82.14 39.97 1128.01 429.47
Mal. Shamir 3 4.43 1.89 174.95 37.35 2340.53 485.11
MASCOT 2 6.56 4.32 196.19 185.71 2688.92 2632.07
MASCOT– 2 3.61 4.41 54.38 181.12 729.08 2654.59
DKLS [DKLS18] 2 3.58 43.73 15.33 109.80 234.37 1002.97
Unbound [Unb19] 2 11.33 315.96 31.08 424.02 490.73 1010.98
Kzen [KZe19] 2 310.71 153.87 1282.81 577.67 14441.83 7237.93
Table 5.2: Comparison of our threshold ECDSA protocols with prior work. Runtime
of our protocols has been obtained by taking the mean over the maximum execution
time over many runs.
Colocation Continent World
Secret (ms) Public (ms) Secret (ms) Public (ms) Secret (ms) Public (ms)
Rep3 0.16 1.27 11.12 18.31 113.86 174.03
Shamir 0.25 1.13 17.17 18.09 243.00 243.82
Mal. Rep3 0.16 1.40 11.00 28.98 115.25 301.66
Mal. Shamir 0.25 1.62 16.90 18.32 241.78 243.18
MASCOT 2.34 1.91 149.26 33.01 2142.31 442.75
MASCOT– 2.40 1.92 145.48 33.21 2132.75 449.43
Table 5.3: Breakdown of key generation benchmarks into the time it takes to generate
the [sk] sharing, and the time it takes to run Open(Convert([sk])). Runtimes are the
maximum time that each step takes.
5.6 Related Works
DNSSEC deployment and measurement. DNSSEC deployment heavily relies
on DNS operators and registrars. Prior works have found issues such as reuse of
signing keys by DNS operators for multiple domains [CvRC+17] and sharing of
RSA modulus among multiple domains [SW17]. Additionally, a large fraction of
domains sign their DNSKEY record twice: once with the KSK (as expected) and
once with the ZSK (which is not used in validation) [CvRC+17]. This not only
increases the DNSKEY packets sizes, but could lead to fragmentation attacks (if
strong RSA keys of size 2048 bits or more are used). This makes domain resolution
inefficient [VDBvRDSP14], but also makes DNSSEC vulnerable to poisoning attacks
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Colocation Continent World
Tuples per sec. Sig (ms) Tuples per sec. Sig (ms) Tuples per sec. Sig (ms)
Rep3 922.27 2.49 898.25 19.91 715.54 247.13
Shamir 1829.69 2.37 1544.31 20.62 402.88 271.80
Mal. Rep3 914.65 2.52 806.13 20.07 309.76 245.14
Mal. Shamir 1792.30 2.91 1154.30 27.03 172.87 416.60
MASCOT 380.19 4.82 233.73 57.02 31.98 756.34
MASCOT– 700.94 2.75 447.85 20.37 68.31 258.85
Table 5.4: Throughput for preprocessing (tuples per second) and the signing time
when amortization is taken into account.
when resolvers do not validate responses [HS13a]. After the DDoS attacks of 2016,
the impact of the attacks and the number of customers of DyN and NS1 that added
another operator was measured [AvRN18]. However, only the domains that use
DyN and NS1 were measured while we measure the use of multiple operators, not
restricting our measurements to managed DNS providers.
Privacy in DNS. Though DNSSEC provides data integrity, it does not provide
confidentiality. “Range queries” [ZHS07a] and private information retrieval [ZHS07b]
have been proposed as a solution to hide queries. Herrmann et. al [HMF14] analyse
the privacy offered by [ZHS07a] and conclude that in the scenario of web-surfing,
inter-related DNS queries are issued by the client and this relation provides a much
greater information than single queries. Castillo-Perez and García-Alfaro [CG09]
also claim that the above described protocol does not provide sufficient privacy.
Hence they proposed to use m servers instead of two and they do not require the
servers to remain non-colluding.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has made privacy an important
topic since the Snowden revelations and protecting DNS information has since been
recognized widely. One of the reasons is the understanding that an attack may not
always take an active form but can also take the form of pervasive monitoring [FT14].
It has considered privacy issues in DNS and DNSSEC in RFC 7626 [Bor15] and in
RFC 7816 [Bor16], and it has standardized DNS-over-TLS in RFC 8310 [DGR18] and
DNS-over-HTTPS in RFC 8484 [HM18] to protect DNS queries in transit between
the user and resolvers. While privacy of DNS queries has been considered by prior
works, we address the issue of privacy of DNSSEC keys.
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Threshold Signatures. Multiple proposals for efficient threshold ECDSA proto-
cols suitable for both 2 and n parties have been developed in the recent past. In the
2-party setting, Lindell [Lin17] provides a protocol that achieves a throughput of
over 100 signatures per second when using four threads. Doerner et al. [DKLS18]
propose a protocol that relies heavily on OT and requires more communication
than the protocol of Lindell, making it less efficient in low-bandwidth environments.
In the more general n-party setting, Gennaro, Goldfeder and Narayanan [GGN16]
present a protocol with a threshold of t ≤ n− 1, whose communication was reduced
by Boneh, Gennaro and Goldfeder [BGG17]. Both these works require a distributed
Paillier key generation scheme, which is inefficient. Gennaro and Goldfeder [GG18]
present a protocol that does not require a dealer for key generation. Lindell, Nof
and Ranellucci [LNR18] present a protocol whose key generation is significantly
slower than signing. Finally, Doerner et al. [DKLS19] generalize their 2-party pro-
tocol [DKLS18] to work for any number of parties. All these works are protocols
tailored for threshold ECDSA in a particular threat model, and hence, restricting
their use. Our work uses generic MPC to construct threshold ECDSA protocol and
is secure in different threat models.
Smart and Talibi Alaoui [SA19] independently identified the generalization of
arithmetic MPC. Both works show how SPDZ-style MACs can be adapted to elliptic
curve computation, and notice that the same idea can be used for other arithmetic
MPC protocols (e.g., Shamir-secret sharing and replicated-secret-sharing). Both
works mention threshold ECDSA as a natural application, while we in addition
split the protocol in user-independent preprocessing and user/message-dependent
computation, as we imagine many users outsourcing their signing capabilities to the
same subset of semi-trusted servers. The main differences are: we have implemented
and benchmarked the resulting protocols against state of the art threshold ECDSA
protocols, and we demonstrate how this can be effectively integrated into existing
DNS software and show a prototype system we deployed. The work of Smart and
Talibi Alaoui does not report on any implementation.
After we showed that most of the material required to generate an threshold
ECDSA signature can be generated in the preprocessing phase, this idea has been
used in follow-up works [GG20, CMP20, DJN+20]. Threshold RSA signatures for
DNSSEC have been considered in the past. Cachin and Samar[CS04] proposed a
distributed DNS to avoid single point of failure, which provides fault tolerance and
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security in the presence of corrupted servers. Cifuentes et al. [CHM+16] emulate a
hardware security module (HSM) at an authoritative name server and they report
timings on a LAN which range from tens to hundreds of milliseconds on commodity




Resource Public Key Infrastructure [LK12] is a cryptographic method to secure
inter-domain routing against prefix and sub-prefix hijacks. It is also a prerequisite
for Border Gateway Protocol Security [LS17]. In RPKI, RIRs allocate IP prefixes
and authorize specific ASes to be the origin of routes. This information is stored
in an ROA. Routers use the ROAs to distinguish legitimate routes from leaked or
hijacked routes. This is known as route origin validation (ROV).
The insecurity of inter-domain routing and the ability of RPKI to address
the insecurity has not transpired into wide-scale deployment of RPKI [GCH+17,
HHSW18]. One of the reasons is the possibility of RIRs to unilaterally takedown
IP prefixes, either deliberately or accidentally, that will result in the prefix of the
affected ASes being unreachable when ROV is performed [CHB+13, KM17]. The
hierarchical structure of RPKI gives RIRs the power to revoke and invalidate any
object that it has issued.
As centralized authorities are easy targets for legal surveillance and coercion,
is it possible to prevent a state-sponsored attacker from imposing its demands on
RIRs without drastically changing the structure of RPKI? The RIRs are bound by
the law of the country they are based in. Their members, however, are based in
different countries and do not have a recourse when their prefix is taken down.
In the past, there have been situations where these problems have taken practical
relevance. In 2011, RIPE NCC took the state of Netherlands to court when the Dutch
police ordered to it to lock registration of four IP address blocks [RIP11, RIP13].
Nevertheless, it was forced to lock down the registrations. More recently, RIPE
NCC mistakenly deleted 2669 ROAs on 1 April 2020 and the ROAs were reinstated
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on 2 April [RIP20a]. This meant that the announcement for these resources were
‘unknown’. On the day when these ROAs were missing, RosTelecom had a route
leak [Qra20]. While the two events seem independent, according to RIPE NCC, 12
prefixes whose ROAs were deleted were affected by the route leak. Furthermore,
RIPE NCC transferred an IP prefix block from a member to another entity based
on a German court order transferred to them through a Dutch court [RIP20b]. As a
matter of procedure, they will do the same if similar situations arises in the future. In
the context of RPKI, this means RIPE NCC will “revoke any certificates generated
by the RIPE NCC” [RIP19].
In this chapter, we address these issues that are prevalent in the deployed RPKI
system by constructing a distributed RPKI system that relies on threshold signatures,
a specific instance of MPC. Our solution, without requiring significant changes to
BGP and RPKI, restricts the power of RIRs and only allows revocation of allocated
resources in legitimate cases with the cooperation of a number of RIRs.
Significance of the threat model
Without RPKI, BGP operates in a default-accept mode where any AS can announce
a BGP route for any IP prefix and the other ASes will accept the route by default.
The default-accept mode makes BGP vulnerable to prefix hijacks and sub-prefix
hijacks [BFZ07, BFMR10, HRA11, DYN08, Cow10] In a prefix hijack, a malicious
AS announces a route for IP prefixes it does not own such that the traffic for those
prefixes are sent to it, and in a sub-prefix hijack, a malicious AS announces a more
specific IP prefix than the one that has been allocated.
RPKI relies on hierarchical and centralized authorities to be honest. Malfunction
or coercion by law enforcement authorities is not incorporated into the threat model.
Such a weak threat model creates an imbalance of power between the RIRs and its
members. Moreover, the power imbalance with RPKI is greater than with Web PKI.
In RPKI, there is no option to request certificates from different authorities, which
is possible with Web PKI. Hence, the reliance on specific RIRs is greater.
Members are further weakened when the authority is based in a different country
than their own. The manipulations at the level of BGP is more coarse-grained
than domain name seizures as BGP granularity is limited to /24, i.e., 256 IPv4
addresses [CHB+13]. The RIRs are bound by the law of the country they are based
in. If members are affected, they may need to take the issue up in another country.
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The slow process may result in the loss of business.
Threshold signatures for RPKI
We propose a distributed RPKI system based on threshold signatures. Threshold
signatures provide a method to distribute trust and they are practical in settings
where the number of participating parties is small. We consider the setting of hosted
RPKI, where INR holders are most vulnerable to attacks as they have no control.
There are five RIRs—AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC and RIPE NCC—and
threshold signature protocols are practical when there are only five participating
parties. Hence, our system requires a threshold of them to agree before making
changes to RPKI objects. This prevents any RIR from unilaterally making changes.
Our solution can be described as follows: threshold signatures use shares of
the private key, where each of the five RIRs will have a share of the private key
and none of them have the entire private key. Using only the shares, the RIRs
can collaboratively sign ROAs and CRLs. Our mechanism prevents them from
unilaterally acting maliciously. Most importantly, threshold signatures support a
stronger threat model where corrupted RPKI authorities are not entirely trusted
and yet play a significant role in making BGP secure.
Contributions
A summary of our contributions:
• We construct a distributed RPKI system based on threshold signatures that
addresses three issues: (1) preventing unilateral IP prefix takedowns, (2)
limiting the scope and implications of attacks on RIRs, and (3) enabling
validation in the case of missing trust anchor.
• We propose two deployment models of our solution and discuss the trade-offs
in these models.
• We show the performance of our distributed RPKI system based on four
threshold signature protocols, all of which have a stronger threat model than
the existing RPKI system.
• We perform extensive evaluation of our system and show that our system is not
only efficient for today’s requirements, but it can also meet future demands.
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Outline
Section 6.1 elaborates on the system and threat model of our system. Section 6.2
describes our distributed RPKI system. Section 6.3 discusses the performance of our
distributed RPKI system. Section 6.4 analyses historical RPKI data to understand
the number of ROAs issued/revoked over time and shows that our system satisfies
the requirements. Section 6.5 discusses the related works.
6.1 System and Threat Model
In this section, we state the threat model of existing RPKI before introducing the
system and communication model. We introduce different threat models from MPC
literature that our solution supports along with the motivation behind each of them.
Then, we introduce the system and communication model that we use in our work.
6.1.1 Threat Model
In our distributed RPKI system, we consider a stronger threat model than the existing
RPKI system. The existing threat model of RPKI includes external adversaries,
but not the participating entities, such as RIRs, to be a possible attacker. In this
chapter, in addition to the threats considered in the existing system, we do not
consider the RIRs to be entirely trustworthy.
Our threat model accounts for mistakes by the RIR as the hosted CA and the RIR
under attack from an external adversary including legal coercion to modify, revoke
or to inject RPKI data. All these scenarios require access to the signing key for the
attack to work. We can capture these scenarios in our system by incorporating RIRs
in the threat model. Note that attacks on the publication point, such as deletion of
RPKI data, are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Standard MPC terminology provides us with a tool kit to discuss threat models
that not only includes external adversaries but also the participating parties. We
consider adversarial power, that is, whether an adversary is passive or active. Then,
we describe the guarantees that can be achieved when the threshold of honest parties
varies. Finally, we describe which guarantees our solution supports and how it
translates to the threats against RPKI.
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Semi-honest vs. malicious security. As we described in § 2.1, MPC protocols
can be classified in terms of the power of the adversary. An adversary can be
semi-honest or malicious. A semi-honest adversary follows the protocol while a
malicious adversary does not follow the protocol and might actively disrupt the
protocol. Security against semi-honest adversaries is sufficient in many real life
scenarios. If the RIRs trust each other not to act maliciously and instead consider
each other to be a necessary check on each other’s operation, a protocol secure
against a semi-honest adversary is sufficient. Such a protocol keeps the signing key
away from any internal adversaries and curious employees at the RIRs.
However, semi-honest security is not sufficient when an adversary actively at-
tempts to corrupt the computation. Such an adversary can maliciously send wrong
values or delay the sending of values. A malicious adversary such as a nation-state
actor can take full control over the RIRs and compromise the RIRs. They can
attempt to inject wrongful information. Hence, we need to check the correctness of
inputs to detect malicious activity. In contrast, a protocol secure against semi-honest
adversaries assumes that the correct inputs are provided. The difference in efficiency
depends on the specific instantiation of the protocols. We show in this chapter
that protocols against malicious adversaries are efficient enough for the purpose of
distributed RPKI.
Honest vs. dishonest majority. Our distribute RPKI system involves all the
RIRs, that is, we use n = 5 for our threshold signature protocol. During the
execution of a threshold signature protocol, a threshold t number of RIRs need to
participate for the protocol to be successfully executed. When a majority of the
RIRs are honest, then it is called honest majority. When a minority of the RIRs
are honest, the protocol is said to be secure for a dishonest majority. In the case of
honest majority protocols, as long as most of the RIRs do not collude, the key is not
disclosed to anyone. As the RIRs often do not converge on the same policies, this
may not be a strong assumption [MvEK11]. However, there are situations where a
dishonest majority protocol might be needed as it provides stronger security such
that the adversary needs to corrupt all the parties to be able to access the signing
key. A dishonest majority protocol might also be required when the signature should
only be created when there is unanimity among the RIRs.
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6.1.2 System and Communication Model
Our system incorporates all the parts of the RPKI that requires generating signatures,
which includes the creation of signed objects, ROAs, as well as signing of the resource
certificates of children and the issuance of CRLs. Unlike traditional RPKI, we propose
a Distributed RPKI (DRPKI) using MPC such that a ROA cannot be signed by
individual RIRs on their own. Our system focuses on the role of RIRs as CAs in
RPKI, specifically in the hosted RPKI setting where the RIR that allocates IP
resources also runs the CA to validate the ROAs. We focus on the key generation
and the signing operation in a distributed RPKI system, such that no RIR has access
to the signing key. RIRs only have access to parts of the signing key (known as key
shares) and not to the signing key. Thus, RIRs cannot unilaterally sign ROAs of
ASes or revoke the associated end-entity certificate.
We inherit the communication model from the underlying MPC protocols. More
specifically, we assume the existence of synchronous communication network where
the protocol is executed in rounds [Can01, KMTZ13]. The communication between
the RIRs is implemented and run on a point-to-point network. We assume that
the RIRs securely communicate with each other using a TLS connection with
authenticated endpoints.
6.2 Distributed RPKI
In this section, we describe the system setup in § 6.2.1. Then, we describe the
different protocol phases of DRPKI in § 6.2.2. Finally, we discuss the deployment
models for our system in § 6.2.3.
6.2.1 System Setup
We present the system architecture in this section. The setup at each RIR is shown
in Figure 6.1 and the DRPKI architecture is shown in Figure 6.2. Each RIR has two
components: trust anchor and hosted RPKI. Each RIR has a CA and a threshold
signature module. RIR CA is the top-level CA that acts as a trust anchor in RPKI.
RIR CA issues the CA certificates to its members and issues manifests and CRLs
for the members. In addition, it also issues a self-signed certificate for itself and a
certificate for the hosted CA. Hosted CA is responsible to produce signed objects:























Figure 6.2: Distributed RPKI architecture.
RIR who choose to use hosted RPKI. The public key and the share of the private
key of the members is stored at the hosted CA. All the certificates and the signed
objects issued by the two CAs are published in public access repositories, through
rsync or RPKI repository delta protocol [BMWA17].
Unlike existing RPKI, our system requires interaction between the RIRs for
the creation of certificates and signed objects (Figure 6.2). RIRs are in different
continents and the communication takes place over the public internet using secure
and authenticated channels. At a high-level, each RIR has a share of a private key
for each member and uses this share to collaboratively issue signed objects. None
of the RIRs get to access the entire private key. They use the shares of the private
keys to create signed objects.
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Key generation ([skj ], pkj)← KGen(1λ)
1. Each RIR takes a security parameter 1λ as the input and generates a
signing key share for the jth member by randomly sampling [skj ]← Zp.
2. Each RIR locally converts [skj ] to [skj ] ·G.
3. RIRs compute the public key
pkj = Open([skj ] ·G)) = skj ·G.
4. Output the secret key shares and the public key ([skj ], pkj).
Figure 6.3: Key generation protocol.
6.2.2 DRPKI Protocol Phases
All phases are instigated by a CA and the interaction takes place between the
threshold signing modules. MPC adds computation and communication overhead
to traditional signing and, hence, we require a protocol that is efficient when the
signing is to be performed. Protocols in the preprocessing model generate message
independent material apriori and require little computation and communication to
complete the signing when the message to be signed is available. Furthermore, most
threshold signature protocols only satisfy some of the threat models we consider in
our system. We want to be able to consider the efficiency of our system under all
the threat models we discussed in § 6.1.1. Hence, we use the protocol described in
§ 5.3 as it is the most efficient protocol that fulfils all our requirements.
Key generation
In the key generation phase, new keys are generated such that each RIR generates
a signing key share [skj ] for each member and runs the key generation protocol.
At the end of this phase, each RIR has the public key pkj and their share of the
signing key [skj ]. The key generation protocol needs to be run every time keys are
to be generated. The keys do not need to be stored in a HSM. The complete signing
key is not exposed unless a threshold number (depending on the protocol being
honest majority or dishonest majority) of RIRs have been compromised or corrupt.




The threshold signing protocol we use has two preprocessing phases and one online
phase. The first preprocessing phase is independent of the member for whom the
signature is to be generated. More specifically, this phase is independent of the
signing key to be used. This property allows us to amortize this phase. This phase
can be run between the RIRs before the member’s request to generate a signature
arrives. Only an estimation of the number of signatures that would be required in a
certain amount of time is required to run this phase. At the end of this phase, the
desired number of initial preprocessing tuples are generated and stored at each RIR.
The second preprocessing phase is dependent on the member for whom the
signature is to be generated. The threshold signature modules at the RIRs use one
unused initial preprocessing tuple. It is security critical that the initial preprocessing
tuples are not reused as it is equivalent to the reuse of the instance key k. An
attacker with two messages signed using the same signing key and instance key
can recover the signing key. At the end of this phase, the desired number of final
preprocessing tuples are generated and stored at each RIR.
In the final signing phase, the member gives consent to the changes that can
be made through a standalone application. This consent is sent to all the RIRs.
When a signature is to be generated, the message to be signed is sent by the RIR
that initiates the signing protocol to the other RIRs. The message can take the
form of ROAs, CRLs, CA certificates or end-entity certificates. The message is
checked, similar to the checks each RIR performs in the existing RPKI system,
where they check the message locally before they individually sign. However, in
our case, the check is performed by all the RIRs for all the messages that need to
be signed. Furthermore, the consent of the member is checked. The RIRs check
whether the consent has been given for the specific change, e.g., the transfer of IP
space to another AS. Note that a transfer of IP-space requires consent for a CRL
for the existing EE certificate associated with the ROA and to create a new signed
ROA. These checks prevent RIRs to unilaterally take decisions to revoke certificates.
If a threshold number of RIRs agree, then the RIRs locally compute their share of
the signature before jointly computing the final signature.
Figure 6.4 describes the protocol details. With regard to the format of the
messages, we do not make any change to the form and fields compared to the
existing RPKI system. The certificates take the form of X. 509 certificates [HML12]
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Signing Protocol
Member Independent preprocessing from Figure 5.4.
(〈k〉, [k−1])← PInd()
Member Dependent preprocessing from Figure 5.4.
(〈k〉, [k−1], [sk′j ])← PDep([skj ], 〈k〉, [k−1])
Online signing. σ ← Sig(〈k〉, [k−1], [sk′j ],M)
1. The member uses a standalone application to give consent, e.g., to transfer
IP-space to another AS. The consent is sent to all the RIRs.
2. Input the message to be signed M and the final preprocessed tuple
(〈k〉, [k−1], [sk′j ]).
3. The RIR initiating the protocol sends the message M to the other RIRs.
4. The RIRs check the contents of M and the consent by the member before
proceeding. If the check fails, they abort ⊥. Else, they continue.
5. Then the RIRs compute
R← Open(〈k〉) = (bc−1) ·G = a−1 ·G = k ·G.
6. Let (rx, ry)← R.
7. Locally compute the share of the signature
[s] = H(M) · [k−1] + rx · [sk′j ].
8. Finally compute s ← Open([s]) and output the signature σ = (rx, s) or
σ = ⊥.
Figure 6.4: Signing protocol.
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while the signed objects conform to RFC 6488 [LCK12]. The RIRs check the contents
of the message out-of-band.
Automation
All the steps in our system are automated and they do not require human intervention
at the RIRs. Note that Step 4 of online signing phase in Figure 6.4 requires checking
the message before the message is signed. We automate this step through a simple
consent mechanism during Step 1. For example, if the customer (AS1) of RIPE
NCC is transferring an IP-space to AS2, then AS1 gives consent to revoke the old
ROA and to issue the new ROA pointing to AS2. This consent is sent to all RIRs
(instead of only to one RIR) from the customer facing software 1. Hence, all RIRs are
informed of the intent of AS1. When the RIRs run the threshold signature protocol,
there is an automatic check for consent. If a threshold number of RIRs have not
received the consent, then the check fails and the automated signing protocol aborts.
Legitimate revocation without consent?
So far, we have assumed that revocation of allocated IP resources requires the
consent of the INR holder. What about cases where there is a legitimate reason
to revoke allocation? Let us take a case where ARIN was fraudulently induced to
issue IPv4 addresses [ARI19]. After the fraud was detected and ARIN won a legal
case, ARIN was able to take back the addresses. Using our automated system with
enforced consent, revocation of the IP address space in such a scenario will not be
possible. However, we are able to accommodate legitimate revocation with a minor
change to the system.
Our automated system aborts the protocol if the check for consent fails at Step 4
of online signing phase in Figure 6.4. Instead of aborting the protocol, we can flag it
with the requirement for manual intervention if the protocol is to be completed. Note
that such a manual intervention will not require a large human effort as, in practice,
most organizations obtain IP address space from their RIRs in good faith and there
are only a few bad apples [RN19]. We will require the RIRs to communicate off
band before the protocol is completed. This mechanism also allows for legitimate
law enforcement requests to be processed by the RIRs, only when a threshold of
1We need a standalone software to send the consent to all RIRs.
91
Chapter 6. Distributed RPKI
other RIRs also agree. Although technically possible, processing law enforcement
mechanisms in this manner is akin to private regulation, which will require legal and
policy changes for it to be realistic.
6.2.3 Deployment Scenarios
In this part, we propose different deployment models. We begin with a naïve
deployment model and explain the reasons for its failure to solve the problem. Then,
we present two solutions with their associated trade-offs among the stake holders.
We emphasise that the trade-offs are not with respect to the security, but with
respect to the responsibilities of the different stake holders.
Naïve solution
In a naïve solution, our threshold signing module can be used for hosted CAs. This
solution allows for the existence of the delegated CAs, which are beneficial to ISPs
who sub-allocate resources. This solution allows for INR holders to run their own
CAs as well, that is, delegated CA system can continue to function in parallel with
hosted CA system, as it does in the current system. So the ISPs which have their
own CA can delegate INR holders and sign the ROAs. However, the only change
is that the signing keys in the hosted CA setup are not in the possession of the
individual RIRs. The trust anchor from the existing RPKI exists and the RIR CA
that is higher in the hierarchy can still revoke certificates unilaterally as it is not
distributed. And, the threat model remains weak and unchanged.
Our solutions
As the naïve deployment scenario does not solve the problem, we propose two
deployment solutions. Both our solutions distribute the trust anchor (TA). Before
discussing our solutions, we give an intuition behind our choice to distribute RPKI
trust anchor. The notion of a TA requires all child nodes to unconditionally trust
an entity. In RPKI, there are five TAs, one at each RIR, which the relying parties
use to verify RPKI signatures. The concentration of power at TAs in the Internet
infrastructure extends beyond RPKI and is also observable in DNS(SEC) and Web
PKI. However, unlike DNS and Web PKI, there are already five TAs in RPKI that
allows for a smooth transition to a distributed TA. Furthermore, the existing system
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of five TAs has had its issues. As the policies of each RIR with regard to TA is
different, some relying parties do not use the TA of ARIN and ROAs issued under
ARIN’s trust anchor locator (TAL) fall to the status of ‘Not Found’ [Tin19]. This
means that even when RPKI is implemented, a significant portion of the networks do
not validate routes originating from North America due to policy decisions and legal
barriers [CC19, YW19]. Thus, in practise, large parts of the world are prevented
from having better routing security. These issues can be prevented if the TA is not
located at individual RIRs with their own policies and is instead distributed across
them.
Two-layered deployment. In our first solution, we propose a two-layered ap-
proach. The upper layer generates a distributed TA to the five RIRs, while the
lower layer uses the threshold signing module for the hosted CAs. In both layers,
the RIRs use our threshold signing module. In the upper layer, a distributed TA is
established using our key generation protocol in Figure 6.3. Each RIR generates
their signing key share and participates in the key generation protocol to obtain
the public key. Once the public key is obtained, each RIR adds the public key to
their TAL as the subjectPublicKeyInfo [CSF+08]. Each RIR has a TA that has
the same public key in the TAL. As no RIR has the private key associated with
this certificate, the RIR CAs do not need to be kept offline. Thus, the RIRs do not
need a subordinate CA to issue child certificates. Furthermore, as each RIR has the
same public key as part of the TA and they have the same subjectPublicKeyInfo
in their TAL, access to the TAL from one RIR is sufficient for relying parties to
validate routes originating from any part of the world that has deployed RPKI.
In the lower layer, our threshold signing module is used by the hosted CAs to
generate signed objects such as ROAs. We are able to support delegated CAs as the
distributed TA at the RIR CAs is used to generate child certificates. Furthermore,
this solution allows for incremental deployment as the LIRs who have already
deployed their own CAs can continue to use them to serve their child nodes while
those who have not deployed their own CAs can start using hosted CA. Note that
the concerns regarding some LIRs being coerced by their country of registration
remains.
Flat deployment. In our second solution, instead of having the RIRs run two
CAs, RIR CA and the hosted CA, we combine the two so that the RIRs only need
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Adversary power
Majority Semi-honest Malicious
Honest Shamir Mal. Shamir
Dishonest Semi. OT MASCOT
Table 6.1: Four MPC protocols for distributed RPKI.
to run one CA. Furthermore, we do not need a TA as we replace the top-down
architecture with a flat deployment architecture. Not only do we eliminate the
hierarchical structure of existing RPKI, we also distribute trust. Moreover, this
solution accounts for a stronger threat model where individual RIRs do not need to be
completely trusted. However, we do not support delegated CAs in this solution. The
CAs only generate end-entity certificates and signed objects; they do not generate
any CA certificate that will allow child nodes to generate their own signed objects.
This also means that child nodes will need the RIRs to generate signed objects for
their child nodes. Nevertheless, we prevent any single entity to be all powerful and
require the participation of a threshold number of RIRs for a signed object to be
generated and ejected.
6.3 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented our system in C++ and have used MP-SPDZ [Dat19] for
the threshold ECDSA protocols. MP-SPDZ includes threshold ECDSA protocol
implementations for all the security models that we are concerned with: honest and
dishonest majority protocols for honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries. In
particular, we use four protocols—Shamir, Mal. Shamir, Semi. OT and MASCOT—
that are shown in Table 6.1. The former two are based on Shamir secret sharing
while the latter two are based on additive secret sharing. We discuss Shamir, Mal.
Shamir and MASCOT in § 5.5.1. Semi. OT is similar to MASCOT but without any
checks to detect malicious actions. We use it to show the performance of dishonest
majority semi-honest protocols. We use all four protocols to implement the system
described in § 6.2.2.
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Figure 6.5: Latency|Bandwidth between regions, where latency is in milliseconds
and bandwidth is in Mbits/s.
6.3.1 Deployment Setups
For performance evaluation, two deployments were set up. For each node, we used
a VM instance AWS c5.2xlarge with a 64-bit Intel Xeon CPU with 3 GHz and 16
GB RAM. We run all the evaluations on a single thread. To make our evaluations
as realistic as possible, we chose to run the experiments based on the location of
the RIRs (See Table 6.2). The five RIRs are in different continents of the world.
So, in the first setting, we run experiments on five AWS VMs that are placed
around the world such that they are representative of the location of the RIRs.
Specifically, we use the machines at Frankfurt, N.Virginia, Sydney, Sao Paolo and
Mumbai while the RIRs are based in Amsterdam, Virginia, Brisbane, Sao Paolo,
Mauritius, respectively. The latency and the bandwidth between the VMs are shown
in Figure 6.5. Furthermore, we also consider the setting where the RIRs could, in
the future, have virtual servers located close to other RIRs. For this purpose, we
also run our experiments on the LAN in Frankfurt.
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ARIN Virginia N. Virginia
LACNIC Sao Paolo Sao Paolo
RIPE NCC Amsterdam Frankfurt
Table 6.2: Location of RIRs and AWS virtual machines.
LAN WAN
Secret Public KGen Secret Public KGen
MASCOT 6.99± 0.04 2.48± 0.02 9.47± 0.03 4490± 1.74 1147± 0.27 5637± 1.25
Semi OT 0.88± 0.04 0.91± 0.02 1.79± 0.03 851± 2.53 486± 0.93 1337± 1.91
Mal. Shamir 0.24± 0.00 1.59± 0.03 1.83± 0.02 198± 0.23 487± 0.61 685± 0.46
Shamir 0.25± 0.04 1.13± 0.08 1.38± 0.06 284± 1.38 382± 3.48 666± 2.64
Table 6.3: Breakdown of key generation timings in milliseconds for [sk] sharing, and
pk.
6.3.2 Experimental Evaluations
Key generation. We benchmark the 5-party key generation protocol in both
settings. The total key generation time is composed of the timings for generating
secret key and public key. Secret key generation involves generating a field element
[sk] while public key generation involves a local conversion of the field element into
an elliptic curve point of order p before being opened. The timings shown in Table 6.3
are the mean and standard deviation over 10 executions of the protocols where
the value taken for each execution is the time noted when the last party completes
the protocol. While the honest majority protocols (Shamir and Mal. Shamir) only
require one round of communication for secret key generation, dishonest majority
protocols (Semi OT and MASCOT) are costlier, especially in WAN setting.
Signing. We benchmark the preprocessing time (member dependent and indepen-
dent) to generates tuples and the online signing time per signature in Table 6.4. For
preprocessing, we present the time taken to generate one tuple when 1000 tuples are
generated in an amortized manner. As the preprocessing does not depend on the




Preprocessing Online Sig Preprocessing Online Sig
MASCOT 4.78± 0.01 1.89± 0.02 6.67± 0.02 50.56± 1.86 1055± 37.23 1106± 26.36
Semi OT 0.96± 0.01 1.51± 0.01 2.47± 0.01 9.00± 0.90 487± 0.40 496± 0.70
Mal. Shamir 1.43± 0.00 1.40± 0.02 2.83± 0.01 10.94± 0.68 283± 0.06 294± 0.48
Shamir 0.98± 0.00 1.30± 0.02 2.28± 0.01 3.77± 0.00 282± 0.18 286± 0.13
Table 6.4: Breakdown of signing timings in milliseconds for preprocessing and online
phases per signature. Preprocessing times are based on amortized generation of 1000
tuples.
They can be used when a new message is to be signed. Note that the online phase
does not involve any elliptic curve operation and, hence, is computationally cheap.
Although dishonest majority protocols are generally costlier than honest majority
protocols, Semi OT has the highest preprocessing throughput in LAN setting
(Table 6.5). Semi OT protocol uses additive sharing that is cheaper than elliptic
curve operations, which is the predominant cost during preprocessing. In the WAN
setting, communication becomes more predominant than local operations. We also
observe that the cost of malicious security in the case of honest majority protocol
is very small. This is especially true in the WAN setting as the extra checks for
Mal. Shamir are local operations and communication becomes the predominant cost.
In Table 6.6, we show the communication per party for the four protocols. We
note that the communication is asymmetric for Mal. Shamir and Shamir. Hence,
we present the mean of the communication over all the parties. We notice that the
preprocessing communication per tuple as well as online signing is significantly higher
for dishonest majority protocols than honest majority protocols. In comparison, the
communication overhead per party is marginal for malicious security over honest-
but-curious protocols.
6.4 Analysis
For the deployment of our distributed RPKI system, it needs to be efficient enough.
In the previous section, we discussed the efficiency in terms of the runtime of our
protocols. In this section, we discuss whether they are efficient enough in terms of
the number of signatures required by RIRs. As our system involves all the five RIRs,
we take into account the cumulative requirements of all of them.
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LAN WAN
Preprocessing Online Preprocessing Online
MASCOT 209 529 20 0.95
Semi OT 1042 662 111 2.05
Mal. Shamir 699 714 91 3.53
Shamir 1020 769 265 3.54
Table 6.5: Throughput for preprocessing (tuples/sec) and online phases (signa-
tures/sec).
KGen Preprocessing (per tuple) Online Signing
MASCOT 0.482 624 0.400
Semi OT 0.113 99.0 0.128
Mal. Shamir 0.271 1.345 0.0768
Shamir 0.206 0.437 0.0512
Table 6.6: Communication per party (KByte).
RPKI data. We accessed the publicly available historical RPKI data maintained
by RIPE NCC that includes the daily archive of the repositories of all the five RIRs
from 2011 onwards 2. We use the historical data from 11 March 2015 till 10 August
2020.
ROA analysis. We use RPKI data to analyse the number of ROAs that have
been added and removed per day in a certain time period. We estimate the number
of signatures required based on this information. Figure 6.6 shows the change on an
average day (mean taken over a month) in ROAs for the five RIRs. On average, we
need about 8000 signatures per day. However, there are days when the load is greater.
This occurs on days when many ROAs are re-issued. Figure 6.7 shows the maximum
number of changes per month. Note that the scale on y-axis is twenty-times that of
Figure 6.6.
We observe from Table 6.5 that for our slowest protocol MASCOT, we are able
to produce 0.95 signatures/sec or 82080 signatures/day in the WAN setting. For our
fastest protocol, we are able to produce 3.54 signatures/sec or 305856 signatures/day








































































































































Figure 6.7: Maximum number of ROAs added and removed per month from March
2015 to August 2020.
than is required on an average day. All our other protocols are fast enough even
on days with peaks in Figure 6.7. In the LAN setting, all our protocols are fast
and have the capacity to produce three orders of magnitude more signatures. The
efficiency of our system makes it possible to scale as the adoption of RPKI increases.
6.5 Related Works
One approach that has been proposed to address the issue of disproportionate
power in the hands of RPKI authorities is to add transparency logs and .dead
objects to RPKI to note the consent of the INR owner for revocation [HCRG14].
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Heilman et al. [HCRG14] use a detector to identify when a ROA has downgraded from
valid to invalid or valid to unknown state and check whether a .dead object is present.
Three problems with their approach: (1) It requires effort not only from the CAs but
also from relying parties. This method depends on relying parties to perform ROV
and to alarm other relying parties. In practice, only about 100 ASes perform ROV
as can be observed at ROV deployment monitor 3, a monitoring platform [RBC+18],
while there are 68289 ASes as of 1 April 2020 4. (2) It performs detection while we
attempt to prevent malicious activities. Attacks can be detected after the fact due to
the transparency and the effort of the relying parties. Accountability in the form of
malicious activity detected post-mortem is not sufficient as ASes may have already
lost out on their business. (3) These .dead objects are used to signify consent from
the child and they are to be signed by the child node. In the hosted RPKI setting,
as the parent manages signing for the child node, the parent can create and sign
.dead objects by impersonating the child.
Another approach is to replace the existing RPKI system with blockchains [HL16].
This approach eliminates the possibility of RPKI authorities revoking previously
allocated resource while they remain part of the blockchain by providing new
resources. The use of blockchain raises other deployment issues such as consensus
algorithm and incentive for the nodes to run the blockchain. If Proof-of-Stake is
used as the consensus algorithm, as proposed in [PFG+18], then the nodes with
greater stake, e.g., large ISPs who are allocated large subsets of IP addresses will
become powerful players, which will create another form of power imbalance. As
blockchain-based proposals suffer from scalability issues, RouteChain [SAA+19]
employs a hierarchy of ASes which are assigned in subgroups to validate BGP
announcements on the blockchain. However, in practice, ASes may have conflicting






Summary and Future Work
There are more people with access to the Internet in 2020 than ever before. And yet,
so many in the world do not have Internet access. All of us who use the Internet,
knowingly or unknowingly, rely on the fundamental protocols that make the Internet
infrastructure. While securing this infrastructure has taken the form of patch-work,
it has also placed critical components of security, such as key management, in the
hands of centralized authorities.
In this thesis, we ask the following question: How can we improve the efficiency
of generic MPC protocols that are secure against a diverse set of adversaries such that
they can be used to secure the Internet infrastructure? We answer this question in the
affirmative by improving the practical efficiency of 2PC protocols and constructing
efficient threshold signatures based on generic MPC before building systems that
use these protocols to secure the Internet infrastructure without entirely relying on
centralized authorities.
In Chapter 4, we demonstrate through extensive evaluations that the practical
efficiency of 2PC based on garbled circuits can be improved by choosing transport
layer protocols based on the network conditions and function to be computed using
2PC. The efficiency improvement through a better use of transport layer protocols
had not been explored before. We develop a modular framework, Transputation that
includes multiple transport layer protocols and 2PC implementations. a direction
that has not been explored before.
In Chapter 5, we construct efficient threshold signature protocols based on generic
MPC that are secure in a diverse set of adversarial models. We transform any MPC
protocol into an equally secure and efficient protocol that computes threshold ECDSA
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signatures. Our transformation may have other applications. Our protocols are in the
preprocessing model, wherein most of the cryptographic computation is performed
in advance. A fast online phase in addition to the preprocessing results in protocols
that are efficient and can produce hundreds of signatures per second.
Then, we use our threshold signature protocols to construct and implement a
multiparty zone signing system that secures DNSSEC keys. Our system prevents
individual DNS operators from accessing the signing keys while not hindering
its ability function and generate DNSSEC signatures. Furthermore, when using
threshold signature protocols secure against malicious adversaries, our system is
secure even when the operational integrity of the operators is compromised, e.g.,
when an operator is coerced by nation-state actors. We also assess the applicability
of our system through a measurement study that estimates the number of domains
which already use multiple operators.
In Chapter 6, we observe that the existing design of RPKI makes IP prefix
takedown a possibility as it has a weak threat model with centralized authorities in
the form of RIRs. We strengthen the threat model and construct a distributed RPKI
system that relies on threshold signatures. Our system prevents rather than detects
IP prefix takedown. We also distribute the trust anchor to prevent situations where
RPKI validation fails due to missing trust anchor. Not only is our system automated
to prevent manual configuration errors, it also does not require any changes at the
relying parties, making it easier to deploy. We evaluate the efficiency of our system
and show that it can handle the present-day load of RPKI as well as scale for future
increase in RPKI deployment.
Through the construction of efficient MPC protocols and their use in building
systems, we have been able to solve specific problems of centralization with respect
to key management in DNSSEC and RPKI. We have proposed protocol techniques,
and designed and evaluated our systems. Nonetheless, there are many more related
problems that are yet to be resolved. This thesis opens opportunities for further
research, with which we conclude this thesis.
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There are research directions that are yet to be explored. We provide pointers for
further exploration to conclude this thesis.
We study 2PC based on garbled circuits with semi-honest security. We conjecture
that our results would naturally extend to protocols with malicious security: this
conjecture is based on the observation that state-of-the art protocols with active
security are based on a technique known as cut-and-choose in which multiple copies
of garbled circuits are sent, checked and evaluated [LR15, KNR+17]. In particular,
the main difference between these protocols and passively secure protocols is not in
the type of operation performed, but mostly in the higher-bandwidth requirements.
Due to this replication factor we conjecture that, in the active security setting,
SABUL will start outperforming TCP at smaller circuit size.
Furthermore, studying the impact of transport layer protocols in the multiparty
case would also be interesting. There are many different protocols based on the
corruption threshold (e.g., honest majority vs. dishonest majority), the number
of parties, the protocol design and the communication pattern. Different MPC
implementations exhibit distinct communication patterns (e.g., communication
rounds and volume of data transmitted during each round). Future work is needed
to devise specially engineered transport protocols for specific computation tasks and
applications. This is an important yet non-trivial research direction, and requires
investigation of the specific properties of the target application as well as the network
conditions in which they are run.
The threshold signature protocols we design and use in the systems we build
are in the security-with-abort model. Malicious parties can abort the computation
and prevent honest parties from getting the output. In some cases, we might need
accountability so that we can attribute which party aborted the protocol. In the
case of our honest-majority protocols, we can construct the signatures as long
as a threshold number of parties remain honest. If some party sends incorrect
inputs, then honest parties can identify this corrupt party through additional local
computation. However, we might want a stronger guaranty so that the party that
aborted can be identifiable by an external party, e.g., for the purpose of audit. In
such cases, we might to extend our protocols to security-with-identifiable-abort
model. While Gennaro and Goldfeder [GG20] propose a tailored dishonest majority
protocol in security-with-identifiable-abort model, it will be interesting if we can
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extend threshold signatures based on generic MPC protocols in a black-box manner.
Extending our protocols to obtain stronger guarantees such as fairness (either
everyone receives a signature, or no one does) and guaranteed output delivery (a
signature is guaranteed to be output, regardless of the actions of corrupt parties) is
also an interesting direction for research. While these extensions for generic MPC
are theoretically possible [CHOR18], practically efficient transformations that can
exploit the properties of signatures would be beneficial. In some applications, the
availability of the system might be of the utmost importance. Any form of denial of
service may not be acceptable. For instance, some domains cannot afford to have
any down time. In such cases, our protocols should have guaranteed output delivery.
The multizone signing system and the distributed RPKI system that we design
are purely technical solutions. For them to be deployed, many non-technical issues
need to be resolved. There are policy and legal barriers that need to be addressed.
Our systems require cross-border communication. In the case of the distributed
RPKI system, the internal policies of each RIR need to be changed as well as the
policies between the RIRs need to be reconsidered for our system to be deployed.
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